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Operational risk has attracted a sizeable amount of attention in recent years as a result of massive 
operational losses that headlined financial markets across the world. The operational risk losses have 
been on the back of litigation cases and regulatory fines, some of which originated from the 2008 global 
financial crisis. As a result it is compulsory for financial institutions to reserve capital for the operational 
risk exposures inherent in their business activities. Local financial institutions are free to use any of the 
following operational risk capital estimation methods: Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA), the 
Standardized (TSA) and/ the Basic Indicator Approach (BIA). The BIA and TSA are predetermined by 
the Reserve Bank, whilst AMA relies on internally generated methodologies. Estimation approaches 
employed in this study were initially introduced by the BCBS, largely premised on an increasingly 
sophisticated technique to incentivise banks to continually advance their management and measurement 
methods while benefiting from a lower capital charge through gradating from the least to the most 
sophisticated measurement tool. However, in contrast to BCBS’s premise, Sundmacher (2007), whilst 
using a hypothetical example, finds that depending on a financial institution’s distribution of its Gross 
Income, the incentive to move from BIA to TSA is nonexistent or marginal at best. In this thesis I 
extend Sundmacher (2007)’s work, and I test one instance of AMA regulatory capital (RegCap) against 
that of TSA in a bid to crystalise the rand benefit that financial institutions stand to attain (if at all) 
should they move from TSA to AMA. A Loss Distribution Approach (LDA), coupled with a Monte 
Carlo simulation, were used in modelling AMA. In modelling the loss severities, the Lognormal, 
Weibull, Burr, Generalized Pareto, Pareto and Gamma distributions were considered, whilst the Poisson 
distribution was used for modelling operational loss frequency. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Akaike 
information criterion tests were respectively used for assessing the level of distribution fit and for model 
selection. The robustness and stability of the model were gauged using stress testing and bootstrap. The 
TSA modelling design involved using predetermined beta values for different business lines specified 
by the BCBS. The findings show that the Lognormal and Burr distributions best describes the empirical 
data. Additionally, there is a substantial incentive in terms of the rand benefit of migrating from TSA 
to AMA in estimating operational risk capital. The initial benefit could be directed towards changes in 
information technology systems in order to effect the change from TSA to AMA. Notwithstanding that 
the data set used in this thesis is restricted to just one of the “big four banks” (owing to proprietary 
restrictions), the methodology is representable (or generalisable) to the other big banks within South 
Africa. The scope of this study can further be extended to cover Extreme Value Theory, Non-Parametric 
Empirical Sampling, Markov Chain Monte Carlo, and Bayesian Approaches in estimating operational 
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This decade has been a watershed period for operational risk, largely characterized by massive 
operational losses that headlined financial markets across the world. The operational risk losses are on 
the back of litigation cases and regulatory fines, some of which are said to have originated from the 
2008 global financial crisis. Litigation on average follows a life cycle that takes between 5 and 8 years 
to move from inception to settlement or a court decision1. These lawsuits and the resultant settlement 
amounts between the parties have been publicly divulged by the courts due to public interest in the 
cases, and the huge amounts involved. Additionally, as these losses are finalised, they will form part of 
the banks’ operational loss databases, creating a challenge for banks using loss data dependent 
modelling1. Thus, the ultimate inclusion of these sizeable settlements has caused a considerable upward 
spike in the regulatory capital charge for banks across the board1. To demonstrate the sheer size of some 
of these operational risk related loss events, the ORX Association News’s top five largest loss events 
for June 2015 are: the API Premiere loss, where around 29,000 investors are believed to have lost a 
total of USD 1.2 billion after being misled by API Premiere Swiss Trust as part of a fraudulent 
investment scheme; the Julius Baer provisions of USD 350 million to settle a US Department of Justice 
investigation regarding its alleged role in enabling US citizens to evade taxes; and PHH Corporation’s 
USD 109 million penalty to be paid to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) after it was 
found to have engaged in a mortgage insurance kickback scheme, to name but a few.2 On the local 
South Africa front, administrative penalties totaling R125 million in 2014 were levied against Nedbank, 
ABSA, Standard Bank and FNB for contravening a provision of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, 
No 38 of 2001. The central bank additionally issued directives to the four institutions to take remedial 
action to address specific areas of deficiencies.3  
 
Because operational risk losses are unpredictable most of the time, and can be substantial as shown 
above, the management of operational risk is fast becoming a primary concern for executive 
management of financial institutions1. This greater focus and attention on operational risk management 
has additionally been strongly advocated by the BCBS and regulators world-wide (inclusive of our local 
South African Reserve Bank [SARB]), compelling banks to employ risk sensitive approaches (which 
are deemed to be advanced compared to quantification methodologies that use multiples of gross 
income [GI]). The Basel II Capital Accord (issued by BCBS in 2006, and its subsequent guidance 








notes), and the South African Central Bank (SARB), give local banks the option of choosing four 
alternatives which they may opt to use to quantify operational risk capital. Regulatory capital is the 
perceived amount that is required by a regulator (typically concerned with systemic risks) for the bank 
to continue operating and be solvent. The four approaches are the Basic Indicator Approach (BIA), the 
Standardised Approach (TSA), the Alternative Standardised Approach (ASA), and the Advanced 
Measurement Approach (AMA). The BIA has no prerequisites with regard to governance frameworks 
and/ measurement tools. The regulatory capital requirement is mathematically a product of the global 
GI and a constant factor (BCBS, 2006). Financial institutions are required to map or chart a series of 
regulatory (Basel II) business lines (BL) to their internal business lines when using TSA and ASA. 
Basel predetermined beta factors are then multiplied by the GI of each business line to attain the 
regulatory capital charge for that respective business line. The business line and their respective beta 
factors are Corporate Finance (18%), Trading and Sales (18%), Retail Banking (12%), Commercial 
Banking (15%), Payment and Settlement (18%), Agency Services (15%), Asset Management (12%), 
and Retail Brokerage (12%) (BCBS, 2006). The sum of the underlying business line’s capital 
requirements becomes the requisite regulatory capital for the bank. TSA and ASA elaborate on the BIA 
by increasing the level of granularity on the bank’s activities into the eight underlying business lines 
mentioned above (BCBS, 2006). For TSA and ASA, there is need for robust risk management, 
innovative measurement tools and a refined governance framework that needs to be in place prior to 
being granted the liberty to use them to quantify operational risk capital, albeit all of which come at a 
substantial cost (BCBS, 2006). Lastly, for AMA financial institutions use internal risk variables and 
their own empirical model to quantify their operational risk capital reserves that are reported to the 
Central Bank, and the corresponding economic capital which is a base number for a bank’s pricing 
engine (BCBS, 2006).  
 
Sundmacher (2007) identifies BCBS’s premise of thought for introducing the varied operational risk 
quantification options that have an increasing degree of sophistication, as a means to incentivise 
financial institutions to apply improved management and measurement methods in exchange for a 
capital reduction as they move from the least to the most sophisticated measurement tool. However, 
compliance costs will arise as financial institutions are mandated to meet specified yardsticks when 
using TSA or AMA. This thesis centers on the realization that financial institutions have to make this 
monetary investment in order to move from TSA to AMA. However, the benefit for moving to AMA 
is not readily obvious. In this thesis I extend Sundmacher (2007)’s work, and test one instance of AMA 
regulatory capital against that of TSA in a bid to crystalise the rand benefit (if any) that South African 
financial institutions stand to attain should they move from TSA to AMA. Using this illustrated process 
South African domiciled banks can calculate the rand benefit for multiple years. Given multiple year 
benefit one may determine the threshold of initial investment for the bank. This initial cost would be 




that the goal of the thesis is not to explicitly measure the costs of the switch but to determine whether 
the benefits are such that they would warrant a bank then assessing the costs of switching. In adopting 
AMA, a significant number of international financial institutions are on a Loss Distribution Approach 
(LDA). In conducting this cost benefit analysis, emphasis is placed on all key building blocks of a 
typical LDA. 
 
1.2 Background to the study  
 
Operational risk is fast becoming one of the leading risks South African banks are faced with in today’s 
integrated and complex global economy. An overview of the past two decades reveals that operational 
failure has often been a major component leading to insolvency of many otherwise successful and 
profitable banks, owing to the unpredictability of operational losses4. Examples of some large 
international institutions that suffered substantial operational risk losses are Drexel, TWA, Barings, 
Maxwell, Olympia and York, Enron and Global Crossing5. Additionally, where large market or credit 
losses have taken place, operational failure is often largely part and parcel, if not the root cause. On the 
South African front, a classical example is the recent demise of ABL owing to an inadequate 
provisioning policy, despite considerable asset write-downs by African Bank’s management6. Thus at 
board level, the accurate quantification of operational risk has become a focal point for the bank’s senior 
executives to understand where their largest exposures are. By analysing risk levels of the bank’s full 
loss profile of the existing business and control environment, executives are able to make informed risk 
transfer, capitalisation and/ mitigation decisions. This mentioned process also creates a greater platform 
to demonstrate that the banks’ operational risk strategies are consciously aligned with the risk appetite 
and tolerance standards of banks’ boards and other stakeholders. Looking at the balance sheets of some 
of South Africa’s financial institutions, operational risk is seemingly starting to be given due recognition 
as a pivotal risk component, as indicated by the mitigation and transfer costs linked to this risk.  
 
1.2.1 Regulatory requirements for AMA 
 
In order to secure approval from the SARB to use AMA, model compliance with the requirements of 
the local regulator, the International Standards and Guidelines for modelling operational risk, and those 
of the internal business’s governance structures, has to be achieved. BCBS (2006) highlights the 
following key qualitative and quantitative criteria for a bank to attain or maintain its AMA status:  
 
a) A bank must capture potential severe loss events in its Operational Risk Modelling approach; 
                                                          
4 See also http://www.bdlive.co.za/world/americas/2015/08/24/banks-lose-260bn-to-fines-and-lawsuits 





b) A bank’s Operational Risk Approach must be sound – comparable to a one year holding period, 
and at 99.9th percent confidence interval; 
c) A bank must have and maintain strenuous operational risk model development and independent 
model validation procedures; 
d) Regulatory capital must be: expected loss (EL) + unexpected loss (UL), unless permission has been 
granted by the relevant regulators to implement additional capital discounts; 
e) A bank’s measurement system must capture severe infrequent possible loss events that drive the 
operational risk capital requirements. This may be achieved by an appropriate granularity selection.  
f) No diversification is permitted, unless specific express sanction is given by the SARB. 
g) A sound operational risk system must include scenario analysis, internal loss data (ILD), relevant 
external data, and factors reflecting the business environment and internal control systems, and 
must be well documented to aid validation and third party audit. 
 
1.3 Statement of the problem and rationale  
 
The Basel II definition of operational risk is the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal 
processes, people and systems or from external events (BCBS, 2006). Thus by extension operational 
risk cannot be fully eliminated as long as there are people, systems and processes that are imperfect by 
design or omission. Operational risk events are due to a myriad of factors some of which are fraud, 
technology failures, improper business practices, natural disasters and product flaws to name but a few 
(De Jongh, De Jongh, De Jongh and van Vuuren, 2012). Operational risk is distinct from market and 
credit risk, however there are instances were large market or credit losses have taken place owing to 
operational failure being largely part and parcel, if not their root cause. Some of the complexities 
relating to the management and quantification of operational risk is the difficulties in reverse 
engineering the components that make up the VaR. However, for credit and market risk it is possible to 
determine each risk factor that makes up the ultimate VaR (Laycock, 2014). 
 
Financial institutions are not presently able to hedge their exposure to operational risk through asset 
securitization, despite operational risk fast becoming a larger share of their total risk exposure. The 
sizable operational losses that financial institutions have suffered as noted by Dutta and Perry (2006) 
has led to increased attention to operational risk. Froot (2003) argues that the increased focus on 
operational risk is driven by the potential devastating ability of operational losses to trigger systemic 
losses across the financial system (and illiquidity). For many South African banks the efficient 
measurement and management of operational risk is an evident opportunity that can lead to increased 
net worth of the business, through minimizing the amount of risk relative to the earnings of the bank. 




value of its future cashflows, adjusted for risk7 - thus, by extension, value can also be added by reducing 
the risk associated with the bank’s earnings (BCBS, 2003a). To achieve such value addition, an alternate 
route could be for South African financial institutions is to incorporate more sophisticated measurement 
techniques to increase shareholder value. AMA is viewed by BCBS (2006) as contributing to managing 
for value by introducing operational risk management systems designed to improve value by generating 
improved operational risk management capability, and delivering capital relief in the process.  
 
However, the requirements for AMA are that financial institutions implement an operational risk 
management methodology and overarching framework that will serve the purposes of modelling 
operational risk in a systematic way, which brings with it varied costs for the institution. So, 
notwithstanding that a bank is required to hold capital to absorb unexpected losses, the bank’s capital 
is also its shareholders' investment, and a certain minimum level of financial return is expected. 
Accordingly, risk and capital should be well-understood, managed and optimised. By making the 
transition from TSA to AMA, capital optimisation is thought to be achieved due to the fact that internal 
data, together with informed, structured scenario analysis using an external database, can be used in the 
calculation of both economic and regulatory capital charges that take into account the idiosyncrasies of 
the bank in question. As opposed to the use of generic beta factors dictated by Basel II, that are not risk 
sensitive nor do they take cognizance of the idiosyncrasies of each bank. 
 
Snyman (2011) noted that South African banks (63 local and foreign controlled banks as per the SARB8) 
are largely making use of the BIA or TSA approaches (or variations of the two), mainly due to the 
following identified reasons: immaturity of AMA within the South African financial markets, the lack 
of succinct industry standards and guidance, the need for complicated risk management processes, 
measurement instruments and frameworks, as well as the prerequisite of robust governance structures 
needed to fully implement AMA (all of which come with significant cost implications). Additionally, 
for the handful of banks that are on AMA globally, one of the biggest concerns for operational risk in 
AMA institutions is, despite having assumed the cost of implementing AMA, they are presently 
growing worries by regulators, which center on the validity of the capital models that are giving wildly 
differing results from bank to bank9. This observation is premised in the observed range of practices 
(AMA) (Range of Practice Paper) which describes discrepancies in industry practices resulting in 
differing results.10 The end result for South African banks that are considering gradating to AMA is 
increased rigorous model governance and conforming requirements, thus by extension further 
increasing the implementation and compliance costs.  











BCBS (2011)  has been encouraging the gradation to AMA, and also highlighting the shortcomings of 
BIA, TSA and ASA, chief of which being that none of these approaches are risk sensitive (Sundmacher, 
2007). The BCBS sees this as inevitably holding back the financial institutions from driving the 
appropriate risk management behavior which is afforded by AMA, owing to AMA being risk sensitive 
(Synman, 2011). When appropriately implemented it (or thought to) effectively rewards managers that 
reduce their exposure to operational risk by reducing their respective capital requirements, and penalises 
those that are risk tolerant (or risk lovers) by nudging up their capital requirements. Though the 
regulators are advocating for AMA, one has to take cognizance of one of the biggest criticism against 
AMA, being that if a bank was on AMA and a large fine for tax avoidance was incurred (some eight 
years ago), this loss would have to be included in its operational risk data set, effectively causing a 
spike in the capital charge. This would be the case even though the bank in question may since have 
addressed the underlying problem (for example, by overhauling a subsidiary where the loss emanated 
from or, by getting rid of implicated clients).  
 
From the above background, it is evident that operational risk has become an area of paramount interest 
in the banking industry. The size of operational risk losses as a result of the intricacies of banking 
practices, products and market players has made the financial community more aware of the grave need 
for banks to be able to effectively measure and manage their respective operational risk exposures. This 
thesis extends Sundmacher’s (2007) work, and tests one instance of AMA regulatory capital against 
that of TSA in a bid to crystalise the rand benefit that South African financial institutions stand to attain 
(if at all) should they move from TSA to AMA. Using this illustrated process banks can calculate the 
rand benefit for multiple years. Though, I limit the scope of the work to calculating a one-year benefit, 
forecasting multiple year benefit will help to determine the threshold of initial investment for a bank.  
The largest four banks “the big four” in South Africa have a combined market capitalisation of 
R647Bn11 (Nedbank R91.96Bn, FirstRand Limited 253.15Bn, Standard Bank Group R181.26Bn and 
Barclays Africa Group R121.52Bn as at 9 February, 2016). These four banks account for approximately 
85% of South African market share.12 Capitec, another big bank in South Africa, has a differing 
operational risk profile owing to its use variant operating model. For all the four big banks (i.e., 
Nedbank, FirstRand Limited, Standard Bank Group and Barclays Africa Group), their ILD is regarded 
as proprietary information. This effectively limited the amount of data that could be accessed for this 
thesis. However, I did managed to collate one set of data that belongs to one of the big four banks. 
Notwithstanding that the data set is restricted to just one of the big four, the scope of this thesis is to 
illustrate a methodology that is representable (or generalisable) to the other big banks within South 
Africa (as affirmed by the ORX bench marking results in Chapter 3 of thesis, under section 3.3).  
                                                          
11 https://www.google.com/finance?q=JSE%3ANED&ei=R4u5VrHRM9fQUd_8l_AF 




The above is achieved through addressing the following research objectives: 
 
a) To outline an Operational Risk Management Framework and Quantification Method for 
Regulatory Capital using the AMA. 
 
b) To apply the proposed Operational Risk Management Framework and Quantification Method for 
Regulatory Capital to empirical data.  
 
c) To apply the Standardised Approach (TSA) to empirical data mentioned in the previous point (b), 
and compute the capital benefit by calculating the difference between TSA capital against AMA 
capital. 
d) To critically test the rand benefit (on one instance of bank data) of gradating from the TSA to the 
AMA (TSA–AMA regulatory capital).  
 
1.4 Chapter summary and structure outline 
 
This chapter introduced operational risk at a global level and then considered the South African context. 
The importance of operational risk modelling was also highlighted and some case examples were 
provided to show how crucial operational risk management is. It is clear that operational risk has 
attracted attention in the banking industry at large. TSA which is viewed as being simplistic in nature, 
with limited sophisticated requirements is an alternate quantification method discussed in the chapter. 
Its rivalry is AMA, AMA offers potential long run benefits although it comes at a cost, expressed in 
terms of compliance costs. Therefore, this thesis focuses on providing an operation risk management 
framework when using the AMA model. Furthermore, it applies the framework to empirical data and 
assesses the potential benefits of migrating from TSA to AMA. The remainder of this thesis is structured 
as follows: the next chapter gives a comprehensive literature and technical study discussing prior 
literature on the quantification of operational risk, the building blocks of operational risk capital 
modelling practices, techniques and methodologies for both TSA and AMA. In chapter 3 the data and 
research methodology is discussed and the conceptual framework provided, whilst in chapter 4 the 
substantial benefits that may be attained when a South African bank moves from TSA to the AMA are 














The structure and approach to the literature review is premised on Sundmacher (2007)’s case study 
based analysis in light of the limited access to other bank’s proprietary data. Sundmacher (2007) 
assesses the case of a financial institution moving from the BIA to the TSA, using hypothesized data 
and he finds that there might be little incentive for financial institutions to move from BIA to TSA. The 
only exception to this finding is where GI generation lies in the low-beta business units. This thesis 
extends the work of Sundmacher (2007) and tests the case of a financial institution moving from TSA 
to AMA. The following section is a deep dive into prior research on AMA and TSA, focusing on the 
complexities of quantifying operational risk as well as the overall need / justification for this thesis (to 
ascertain if there is a definitive answer to the research question, in particular for the South African 
banks). The author’s intention in preparing this work is to be as pragmatic as possible, shying away 
from more statistical sophistication than necessary. 
 
2.2 Prior research on AMA and TSA  
 
Some of the estimation approaches employed in this thesis were initially introduced by the BCBS, 
largely premised on an increasingly sophisticated approach to the quantification of capital to incentivise 
banks to improve their measurement and management of risk while benefiting from a lower capital 
charge through gradating from the least to the most sophisticated measurement tool. Francesco and 
Ardita (2012) test the validity of this implicit benefit. They assess the profitability of using AMA 
through a cost–benefit analysis for Albanian financial institutions. In the process, they identify some of 
the main hurdles that Albanian banks face in the implementation of AMA. There are two distinct 
branches of AMA identified that is, the LDA and the Internal Measurement Approach. Francesco and 
Ardita (2012), highlight the use of External Data (ED) in Scenario Analysis (referred to as an indirect 
method of using ED). In using the alternate method, referred to as the direct LDA approach, external 
data is initially treated in any of the following ways: linear adjusting the data to the institution’s 
dimensions; using coefficients for each type of event using regression; applying a data filter (to ensure 
that the data relates to a similar sized bank) and a fourth alternative that requires no adjustment, but 
where the data is just integrated into the modelling process. The paper also touches on the various 
options for integrating the internal and external data. The mentioned techniques are Qualitative 
Integration (which is used in this thesis), Bayesian Aggregation, and Convolution. Francesco and Ardita 
(2012) highlight the pervasive challenge within operational risk of lack of information or data either 




Analysis, or the incorporation of additional data. The additional data referred to would seem to allude 
to the use of External Data, through Extreme Value Theory (Body, and Tail modelling), which is 
suggested as an area of further study in this thesis. The complexities in the quantification of operational 
risk using AMA are highlighted as data shortage, the nature of operational risk, and the lack of a strong 
risk sensitive exposure measure in operational risk modelling. For the Albanian market, they also touch 
on the challenge of obtaining at least five years’ worth of historical loss data prior to a bank being 
allowed the right to quantify its risk using AMA – this being a challenge that within the thesis is 
highlighted as a possible impediment for South African domiciled banks as well. The third hurdle 
identified is the lack of an external data collection process among Albanian banking system participants. 
Allen and Bali (2004) bring to the fore an additional complexity in the use of external data and that 
being the lack of low frequency, high severity events which are crucial in informing the tail of the 
parametric distribution. Additionally, risk data gathered during an economic expansion is deemed to be 
unsuitable to be used during a recession.  
 
Notwithstanding the above, Kaiser and Kohne (2006) concede that there are some expected benefits of 
gradating to AMA, including the elimination of regulatory arbitrage (as the capital charge is entirely 
based on the individual’s bank risk exposure to operational losses); an increased level of flexibility in 
incorporating innovation in the quantification process (internal models); AMA’s consideration of risk 
controls, diversification benefits, as well as risk transfer contracts (insurance), which effectively reduces 
the capital charge; that it encourages banks to improve risk management processes and procedures, and  
a reduced compliance cost owing to alignment between regulatory and economic capital (Regulatory 
Capital is calculated at a confidence interval of 99.9%, whilst Economic Capital is calculated at 
99.93%). Some of the qualitative drawbacks of AMA include being able to do just as much risk 
management as AMA when using simpler approaches (Rebonato, 2007); the fact that only large 
international banks are permitted to use AMA, thus giving them unfair advantage compared to smaller 
competitor banks; there being no guarantee of a capital benefit post gradating to AMA, and the 
exorbitant development costs for the internal models. This thesis will assist in addressing the latter, as 
it goes into detail on the implementation of an LDA in the quantification of operational risk using AMA, 
and tests the potential benefit for South African banks gradation to AMA from TSA.  
 
In a bid to demonstrate the growing importance of the ability to assess, predict, and effectively manage 
operational risk, El Arif, F. Z. and Hinti, S. (2014) quote some examples of the huge operating losses 
that have had a profound and detrimental effect on financial markets. These include Enron’s US$2.4 
billion cost; Allied Irish Bank’s US$690 million, and Barings Bank’s US$1.3 billion. The sheer 
magnitude of these examples is a clear indication to South African financial institutions for the urgent 
need to be able to define, measure and manage operational losses. A key strategy to hedge operational 




El Arif, F. Z. and Hinti, S. (2014) also discuss the complexities of quantifying operational risk, chief of 
which is the notorious lack of credible historical loss data, especially rare losses with a high severity. 
To further exemplify this element, a typical Poisson distribution requires a minimum of 1,082 
observations, whilst a severity distribution, for example a lognormal distribution, needs more than a 
million points to produce an acceptable estimate (with an error margin of 5%, and a level of confidence 
of only 90%). In contrast to Kaiser and Kohne (2006), El Arif, F. Z. and Hinti, S. (2014) state that AMA 
methods lead to an a priori lower capital charge in comparison to BIA, and additionally state that though 
the gross implementation costs of AMA may be deemed as high, its marginal cost is not. In assessing 
BIA against TSA, traditional banks that largely deal in retail banking / brokerage would be better served 
under TSA as they would be charged 12% of their GI, whereas under BIA they would be charged a 
higher beta factor of 15%. In the instance of a traditional retail banking outfit, it is more profitable to 
advance to TSA, as opposed to remaining on BIA.  
 
Valova (2011) assesses all three Basel II approaches for the calculation of regulatory capital for 
operational risk, focusing on the methodologies of quantifying operational risk, as well as the 
advantages and disadvantages of each particular method. Three methods within AMA are identified, 
which is an extension from the two identified by Francesco and Ardita (2012). These are the Internal 
Measure (International Measurement Approaches), Distribution Losses (LDAs), and Systems 
Indicators (Scorecard Approaches). Valova (2011) highlights that IMA presumes a linear relationship 
between expected losses and unexpected losses. In analysing LDA, he identifies the difficulties of 
combining internal and external data, with the internal data having an insufficient quantum of 
catastrophic losses. The solicitation of expert opinion is suggested as a plausible solution to this 
shortcoming. The modelling of expert opinion is beyond the scope of this thesis. The other source of 
complexity in the quantification of operational risk is with regard to the fact that the Basel II definition 
does not include all operational risks (the definition only accounts to approximately 50% of its actual 
size). Mention is made that AMA allows a capital benefit of up to 20% on the basis of commercial 
insurance, although in the Czech Republic the impact of commercial insurance has been insignificant. 
To emphasise the impact of operational risk losses on financial institutions, Valova (2011) lists a 
selected few operational risk events that have happened across the world, the largest being US$48 
billion from Nomura Securities, owing to inadequate trading limits and controls. Valova (2011) found 
that 9.8% of the total capital requirements of the Czech banking sector was allocated to operational risk 
regulatory capital. The largest risk that dominates the Czech banking sector is Credit Risk, to which 
88% of the sector’s regulatory capital is allocated to. A crucial weakness relates to the possible bias that 
could emanate from the expert opinion that is fused on to historical loss data – for example, where 
management may have the tendency to overestimate the quality of its management, owing to possibly 





Sundmacher (2004) takes to task the use of GI as an operational risk indicator as used in TSA and BIA, 
and discusses alternative leading indicators at length. Though the subject matter may not talk to the 
direct gradation from TSA to AMA, some of the pertinent issues of this article that relate to this thesis 
are highlighted here. The decision as to which quantification method to opt for is viewed as a cost / 
benefit trade-off between the developmental costs, the data collection, and collation costs, against the 
benefits of regulatory capital relief. Again in this article as in that of Sundmacher (2007), the issue of a 
bank’s structure being a major influencing factor between the two alternatives comes to the fore. A note 
is made that neither of the simplistic options will result in a capital relief on the basis of commercial 
insurance, diversification benefits or contingency plans. Sundmacher (2004) alludes to the fact that 
trading volumes may be a more suitable indicator of operational risk than GI. In direct contradiction to 
Sundmacher (2004), the BCBS justifies its choice of GI as the ideal operational risk indicator (for BIA 
and TSA), owing to its simplicity, comparability, reduction of arbitrage possibilities and a lack of 
evidence of greater risk sensitivity of other indicators. Sundmacher (2004) concludes by highlighting 
the grave possibility of gaming under both BIA and TSA [See also collaborative sentiments from 
Synman (2011)]. 
 
Laycock (2014)’s paper focuses on AMA models, and in particular their data requirements, the link to 
risk management, and issues surrounding their implementation. The novel elements that he brings to 
the fore are: identification of the fact that data collection, storage and analysis infrastructure costs are a 
key hindrance to a bank’s migration from TSA to AMA; and that in the case of TSA and BIA the only 
way to reduce the risk estimate is to earn less GI, an objective which would not sit well with any of the 
stakeholders of the business.  Some of the complexities he identifies relating to the management and 
quantification of operational risk is the difficulties in reverse engineering the components that make up 
the AMA quantum. For Credit and Market Risk it is possible to determine each risk factor that makes 
up the ultimate VaR. In Laycock (2014)’s conclusion, he takes cognisance of the cons surrounding 
AMA, but is of the opinion that despite these, AMA models are still preferable to TSA and AMA, 
especially in relation to risk sensitivity and risk management support. Also of interest, on a technical 
detour, is his identification of the challenges of using a directly observable value from an ALD at 99.9% 
confidence level. Difficulties in validation, and possible volatility as a result, is mentioned, and it is 
suggested that a lower value for a lower confidence interval possibly be taken, and then possibly scaling 
it up to produce a value equivalent to the 99.9% confidence interval demanded by the regulators [this 
translates to conceptualising the 1 in 20 year event, which is a far better bet than trying to conceptualise 
a 1 in 1000 year event]. This approach is not new per se, but has been borrowed from Market Risk, 
where a scalar of 3 has been used. 
 
Kaiser and Kohne (2006) concur with Francesco and Ardita (2012), and identify a fundamental problem 




with a lower regulatory capital charge. The problem is the AMA assumption that the summation of high 
percentiles of VaRs is an ideal indicator of the inherent operational risk within a bank. This by inference 
means that the worst possible outcomes occur simultaneously, which in reality is hardly ever the case. 
Added to this, should the assumption of perfect correlation across Operational Risk Cells (ORCs) be 
assumed valid, then the capital charges of the various ORCs should be summed, and in the process 
effectively resulting in a higher capital charge than that determined by the simpler approaches. Kaiser 
and Kohne (2006) conclude, in agreement  with Nash (2003), that financial institutions should not take 
it as a given that changing to AMA  will definitely result in a capital benefit, but should rather explore 
all available quantification methodologies in a bid to identify the ideal method that takes the 
idiosyncrasies of the particular bank into account. This view coincides with the findings of Sundmacher 
(2007), who used a hypothetical example to show that the capital benefit (if at all) depends on a financial 
institution’s distribution of its GI. In his specific example, he found that the incentive to move from 
BIA to TSA is non-existent, or marginal at best. In the following part of the chapter, I look at prior 
literature on operational risk modelling approaches under the ambit of AMA. 
 
2.2.1 Prior research on AMA modelling approaches 
 
Afambo (2005) investigates the implications of AMA in operational risk capital quantification within 
a Basel II and US regulation paradigm. The AMA model developed in this article uses LDA and 
Extreme Value Theory (EVT) to quantify operational risk. Four quantification methodologies are 
identified, and these being Probabilistic approaches, Fixed Ratios, Risk – Based Capital and Scenario 
Based approaches. Probabilistic approaches such as AMA though convolute are regarded as being 
superior to their counterparts largely on the basis of their use of simulations to ascertain the probability 
distribution that best describes the possible outcomes13. The assumed intrinsic design behind Basel II 
quantification methods that being AMA should provide a capital reduction incentive ahead of TSA, and 
BIA is brought to question14. This skepticism is supported by the results of a survey carried out by Fitch 
in 2004, wherein forty two banks from around the world also expressed their support of the view that 
is was possible that BIA and / TSA could generate a regulatory capital charge that was lower than that 
quantified by AMA (Fitch, 2004). The additional criticism against AMA is the use of EVT and LDA 
to appropriately capture the peculiar nature of operational risk. The assumptions behind EVT and LDA 
are regarded as being at logger heads with the actual attributes of operational risk. (Embrechts, 
Kaufmann, and Samorodnitsky, 2004). Afambo (2005) identifies a pervasive problem that has not been 
appropriately highlighted by other scholars, and that being that most models are by design and intent 
                                                          
13 KPMG. (2002). Commission services study prepared by KPMG on the methodologies to assess the financial position of an insurance 






more appropriate for larger data pools. This underscores the need for empirical studies that take 
cognisance of the varied hurdles in the quantification process, namely limited data, computational 
resources and decision time. The empirical investigations carried out by Afambo (2005) make use of 
public data from Fitch Risk Management for the period 1980 to 2002. The public data had a collection 
threshold of US$1 million, and mainly comprised of banks (1,245) and insurance (381) companies. This 
is in direct contrast to this thesis empirical research which makes use of privately held data of a South 
African domiciled bank. The use of a single bank’s ILD set evades issues faced by Afambo (2005) 
relating to the need to assess the appropriateness or lack thereof to treat the contributing bank’s 
truncation point as a constant and a known. In the case of this thesis, the truncation (discussed in section 
2.6.1.1) is a known (R10, 000), and constant. Thus the key challenges of empirical research based on 
public data is the unknown truncation point (referred to as a reporting bias), and scaling issues owing 
to different sized banks contributing to the data set.  Afambo (2005) uses Random truncation modelling 
that assumes a logistic distribution to address the reporting bias. In his article, he further affirms our 
use of the Poison distribution to model the frequency of loss occurrences. In modelling dependency 
structures, a Student’s T - Copula approach is used.  
 
The conclusive findings that have relevancy to this thesis are: the results indicated that in the instance 
that a constant and known truncation point is assumed (as is the case in this thesis), the resultant severity 
parameters were found to be higher than the alternative, wherein a logistic distribution is assumed. The 
thought behind this observed phenomenon was that the case of the assumed known and constant 
truncation point ignores the inherent reporting bias within the data, and thus assigns equal weighting to 
all losses. The overall impact of this total disregard of the reporting bias, resulted in higher levels of 
regulatory capital. The remaining distinctive difference largely remains that Afambo (2005)’s use of 
public data with varying contributors, giving rise to the reporting bias. Whereas, in this thesis, the 
contributor is a singular entity, whose data collection thresholds, as well as the truncation points are 
known constants. Thus the higher capital charge observed by Afambo (2005) is unlikely to be a factor 
within the results of this thesis. The riskiest event type within the Fitch data set analysed, was CPBP 
and IF and in particular in the investment banking space (which were found to drive regulatory capital). 
For model selection, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) was used as is the case in this thesis (see 
addition detail on the AIC on section 2.6.3.1). However, in contrast the Kolmogorov – Smirnov and 
Anderson Darling tests were not performed, reasons of which are detailed in Moscadelli (2004). 
Afambo (2005) found that if one is using Cauchy or Student’s T – Copula, the savings range for banks 
levelled out at 6% to 10%. The ultimate capital results attained in this research article are in line with 
other prior research, and would seem to validate the random truncation assumption (on the back of 
appropriately calibrated scaling mechanisms or methodologies). This paper is one of the few articles 




truncation model, EVT and copulas, some of whose ideas have been used as building blocks in this 
thesis (as shown in the technical review).  
 
Synman (2011) investigates the development of an end to end operational risk quantification model 
touching on all key building blocks (data analysis, capital calculation and allocation), in a case study 
format. The main driver and justification for his article is the realisation of a lack of a comprehensive 
best – practice approach to quantifying operational risk under AMA irrespective of the succinct 
guidance notes detailed by BCBS 2009, and 2011b. The novel elements that he brings to the fore are: 
the importance of selecting the desired level of granularity, as a too granular a level may lead to 
distributional split and scarcity of data whilst the alternative may lead to over – fitting and 
parameterisation of data. The BCBS (2009)’s range of practice survey found that most banks had 20 to 
60 operational risk classes (ORC). The level of granularity chosen may also have bearings on capital 
allocation process, and the Use Test (both of which are out of scope of this thesis). Synman (2011) 
specifically uses EVT, thus the choice between light – tailed and heavy tailed theoretical distributions 
to model severity, determination of the optimal truncation points and thresholds is also of vital 
importance. The light tailed distributions considered were: Beta; Chi – Square; Exponential; Gamma; 
Inverse Gaussian; Lognormal; Normal; Weibull and Rayleigh. The heavy tailed distributions 
considered were: Burr; Cauchy; F; Generalised Pareto Distribution; Generalised Extreme Value 
Distribution; Log Gamma; Log Logistic; Pareto; Student T [additional context can be read from 
(Mignola and Ugoccioni, 2006)]. Notwithstanding the fact that for this thesis only, four of the eighteen 
distributions mentioned by Synman (2011) were utilised, the four are sub-exponential distributions that 
adequately estimate the tail properties of the empirical data. It is worth noting that as per the Basel 
Committee’s paper on Range of Practices (BCBS160b) 31% of the AMA banks apply a single 
distribution model to all the data with the Lognormal and Weibull being the most widely used 
distributions. The Lognormal is used by 33% of the AMA banks while the Weibull is used by 17% of 
the AMA banks – half the banks applying the single distribution model for all the data use as is the case 
in this thesis. Having stated which theoretical distributions are largely used for modelling loss severities, 
Synman (2011) depicts the Poisson, Geometric and Negative Binomial as those that can be used to 
model loss frequency. However, there is an overwhelming amount of empirical and literature from the 
likes of Mignola and Ugoccino (2006), De Fontnouvelle, P., Rosengren, E. and Jordan, J. (2004) and 
BCBS (2009) that advocates for the use of the Poisson Distribution in describing the loss occurrences 
over a sustained period of time.   
 
The tests and graphic plots commonly used to ascertain the above elements are: Tail Plot; Mean Excess 
Plot; Hill Plot Estimator; Huisman, Koedijk, Kool and Palm Plot; Stability Parameter Plot and finally 
the Dekkers, Einmahl and de Haan plot. Various distribution fitting methodologies are discussed, 




Squares (WLS), Robust Least Squares (RLS) and Method of Moments (MoM). For this thesis, MLE, 
and WLS were used to determine the fit for the ILD, and Scenarios respectively, whilst the EVT tests, 
and graphic plots where not performed. In operational risk the quality of fit has a considerable impact 
on the ultimate capital charge, the following Goodness of Fit (GOF) tests were applied: Kolmogorov 
Smirnov (KS); Cramer von Mises (CM); Anderson – Darling (AD); Analysis of fit difference and 
Evaluation of Probabilities and Quantities. In this thesis I discuss, and perform the KS, CM and AD 
(these are mentioned as being most significant for evaluating theoretical distributions). Synman (2011) 
makes no mention of the Chi Square test and the Mean Square Error (MSE), on the basis that these are 
not commonly used in practice, and their inherent limited sophistication in comparison to the other GOF 
tests mentioned.  The GOF tests discussed are largely numerical technics, but to complement these 
graphical GOF tests are available and extensively discussed in Dutta and Perry (2006). Synman (2011) 
lists the following as being commonly used: Probability Differences Plot; Probability – Probability Plot 
(PP Plot) and Quantile – Quantile Plot. To understand the interdependence structures between the 
business lines and / or event types dependent simulation of the copulas was used (in particular the 
Gaussian copula). Synman (2011) gives both the methodology of calculating Diversified VaR, and 
Stand-alone Var. The Stand-alone VaR assumes that all ORCs are 100% correlated (full dependence), 
an assumption held in this thesis. In analysing his findings, the retail and investment banking sections 
of the bank had the highest allocations of capital, as these two are understood to have the highest overall 
risk exposure.  The other supporting business, and other smaller frontline business units with limited 
scale, complexity and scope also reflected a lower regulatory charge as per expectation. Similar trends 
were evident with regard to Expected Loss (EL). The retail business had the highest EL, as it had 
frequent lower value losses; whereas the investment banking arm had a far lower EL, as the losses they 
face are high impact low frequency losses. In his comparison of AMA and TSA’s ultimate calculations, 
he observes that beta factors for TSA would seem to be wrongly calibrated as their application seems 
to be at loggerheads to the inherent operational risk. Additionally, he finds that the individual business 
unit regulatory capital proportions are approximately the same as those of EL under TSA, indicative of 
an anomaly within TSA beta factors. In the following part of the chapter, I look at prior literature as 
well as a technical review on operational risk quantification under the ambit of TSA. 
 
2.3 The standardised approach (TSA) [Technical Review] 
 
The BCBS proposed two operational risk quantification methods that are premised on a financial 
institution’s GI. These are the BIA, and the TSA. GI is defined as net interest income + net non-interest 
income (BCBS, 2006). Sundmacher (2007) highlights that the income figure is gross of operating 
expenses, provisions, income from insurance, realised profits or losses from the sale of securities in an 
institution’s banking book, and any irregular items. Additional insights on the building blocks and the 




detailed in (BCBS, 2006). In TSA banks are called upon to map or atlas their overall annual GI into 
business lines that are predefined by BCBS. TSA is marginally granular in comparison to BIA in that 
the GI is scaled by a BCBS predefined beta factor (whereas in BIA operational risk capital is calculated 
as a fixed percentage of an annual three year average positive GI). The beta for each business line is 
pre-determined by the BCBS, and its magnitude is said to be largely dependent upon a business line's 
riskiness (Fatima and Said, 2014). BCBS (2006) identifies the following business lines and their 
respective betas as illustrated in Table 2.1: 
 
Table 2.1: Business lines and their betas15  
 
Business Lines  Beta Factors 
Corporate Finance 18% 
Trading and Sales  18% 
Retail Banking  12% 
Commercial Banking  15% 
Payment and Settlement  18% 
Agency Services 15% 
Asset Management 12% 
Retail Brokerage 12% 
 
The total capital charge using the TSA is attained by summing up the underlying business lines’ capital 
requirements. This is mathematically articulated in the following manner (BCBS, 2006):   
 
KTSA = {∑years1-3 max [∑ (GI1-8 * β1-8), 0]} / 3 (2.1) 
 
The above formula calculates the total operational risk capital charge by taking the GIs for the eight 
business lines in Table 2.1, and multiplying them by their respective beta factors. In cases where there 
is a negative GI, a zero value is used. The mathematical product of GI and the respective betas for each 
of the business lines are summed for the past three years, and an average is obtained by dividing by 
three, which gives us the operational risk capital charge using the TSA model. Sundmacher (2007) 
highlights as key differentiator between BIA and TSA that an overall reduction in the capital charge 
may be attained when a negative GI of one business unit or line is offset against another, whereas in the 
BIA no such liberties are permitted. Sundmacher (2007) concludes that, notwithstanding the setoff 
                                                          





afforded by TSA, the overall capital charge cannot be negative and hence lead to a setoff against market 
or credit risk capital levels.  
 
2.4 The advanced measurement approach [Technical Review] 
 
Of the available operational risk quantification methods, the most erudite approach is the AMA. The 
AMA gives banks free reign to choose an idiosyncratic quantification methodology, this thought is 
premised on providing banks with the platform to innovate the quantification / measurement process as 
they deem fit. The full details of this rationale are detailed in BCBS (2001). In this section I focus on 
the key pillars for a robust AMA modelling program. 
 
The SARB regulations and BCBS (2006) define requirements for operational risk management from 
both a qualitative and quantitative perspective. The Basel II regulatory guidelines for the AMA state 
that capital should be calculated using appropriate quantitative and qualitative criteria (see also sections 
1.2.1 of this thesis). The recurrent and stable losses that can be predicted are referred to as expected 
losses and the rare large loss events that are out of the norm losses are referred to as unexpected losses 
(Fatima and Said, 2014). In the regulatory capital context, the unexpected loss is the deviation above 
the mean at a specified confidence level, whilst the expected loss (EL) is the  arithmetic mean of a loss 
distribution, as shown below (BCBS, 2006; Moscadelli, 2004). 
 




Figure 2.1 provides a diagrammatic view of unexpected and expected losses (at the 99.9% confidence 
level for a 1-year holding period). It details the fundamentals of operational risk modelling, highlighting 
that an Aggregate Loss (AggL) Statistic; an Expected (aggregate) Loss (EL) and VaR are defined as 
                                                          




EL = mean (AggL) and Varα = inf {I € R: FAGGL (I) ≥ α}.  VaR at the confidence level α is given by the 
smallest number I such that the probability that the (AggL) exceeds I is at least α. That is, it is in the (1 
– α) th percentile (Shevchenko, 2011). Basel II regulatory guidelines for AMA states that a bank needs 
to show that its operational risk quantification approach has taken cognizance of ‘tail’ loss events (at a 
99.9 percentile confidence interval) within a one year holding period (BCBS, 2006). The use of VaR in 
measuring the regulatory capital requirement aligns with this requirement, as the time period and a 
confidence level are amongst the important components of defining a VaR. (Shevchenko and Wuthrich, 
2006). 
 
2.4.1 Data used in AMA modelling  
 
A financial institution that intends on adopting AMA is required by the regulations to demonstrate the 
use of the key data aspects in order for it to meet the supervisory soundness standards (BCBS, 2006). 
These data elements include ILD, external loss data (ELD), scenario analysis, and factors reflecting the 
business environment and internal control systems (BEICFs). These data elements may be used as direct 
or indirect inputs into the model. BEICFs are informed by risk control and self-assessment (RCSA), 
together with the key risk indicators (KRI) (BCBS, 2006). Measuring operational risk requires historical 
loss data. However, most South African banks do not have much ILD, a problem that is pervasive across 
the world (as detailed in the first section of this chapter). In addition, since operational risk distributions 
have “long tails”, in order to accurately measure the probability of loss in the tail region one needs an 
extensive quantum of data (BCBS, 2006). The amount of data required depends on a number of factors. 
Two of the most important factors are whether the data are independent and identically distributed 
(i.i.d.), and the volatility of the underlying distributions. If the data is not identically distributed, then it 
must be in sufficient amounts to represent each class of exposure available for modelling. As 
highlighted in BCBS (2006), there are two types of historical loss data, ILD and ELD, which is briefly 
discussed below.  
 
2.4.1.1 Internal loss data  
 
ILD of a minimum of five years needs to be collated if it is to be part of operational risk VaR capital 
calculations. The data must contain all notable activities and exposures, with a possible loss collection 
threshold being imposed. The information collected must be complete with regard to gross loss 
amounts, date of event, recoveries, and anything that will assist with the identification of the cause or 
drivers of the event (Shevchenko, 2011). Full details on supervisory guidelines regarding ILD for AMA 
can be found in BCBS (2011). In the same year, BIS published a paper providing operational risk data 




the AMA (Range of Practice Paper)17. Some of the key findings were that the absence of definitions for 
“gross loss” or “recoveries” from the regulators, and the differing data capturing practices among banks, 
resulted in differences in the loss amounts recorded for similar events, leading to potentially massive 
discrepancies in banks’ respective capital calculations (BCBS, 2011). The differing practices was 
substantiated by the fact that, for example, 42 participating AMA banks (43%) modelled on a “gross 
loss after all recoveries” (except insurance), whilst “gross loss before any recoveries” was used by 29%, 
“net loss” was used by 14%, and the balance of 12% used “other definitions” (BCBS, 2011). 
 
2.4.1.2 External loss data  
 
There are three types of ELD, public data, consortium data and insurance data (not discussed in this 
thesis). This type of industry data that is available from external databases has some key draw backs 
which Lambrigger, Shevchenko and Wuthrich (2006) discuss at length. The chief drawback these 
authors highlight is that it is problematic to adjust the data to processes within a respective bank owing 
to differing thresholds, volumes, etc. In an earlier study by Shevchenko and Wuthrich (2006), it is 
argued that external data tends to suffer from survivorship bias. Public data is largely information that 
is sourced from publicly available pools, the likes of newspaper reports, legal judgments etc. Public 
data sets normally have a strong size-based reporting bias making it difficult to extract severity and 
frequency parameters from it (Shevchenko and Wuthrich, 2006). This data is ideally used in practice in 
different forms; from building scenarios to benchmarking correlations (in the calculation of diversified 
capital). Consortium data are pooled sets of internal data submitted by member organizations such as, 
for example, the Operational Riskdata eXchange Association (ORX). ORX is dedicated to advancing 
the understanding of operational risk with respect to financial services industry18. It collects operational 
risk loss events from its members, all of whom are banking institutions, through the ORX Global Loss 
Database. The threshold for the operational risk losses submitted to the consortium by its members is 
€20,000. Consortium data is not subject to public (media) reporting biases19 (Shevchenko, 2011). The 
key challenge for African domiciled banks is likely to be the fact that such consortiums are largely 
made up of large international banks that reside and operate outside Africa, with only four members 
from Africa (being part of the ORX association). This gives rise to the need to devise a scaling tool that 
will take into account the varied inflations, currency, GDP parities before that data may be deemed 




                                                          
17 www.bis.org/publ/bcbs160.htm.   
18 https://www.orx.org/Pages/HomePage.aspx 
19 Major issues with External data are to do with the use of different volumes and other factors, chief of which is survival bias as data of all 




2.5 Modelling operational risk 
 
Frequency refers to the number of events that occur within a given time period. In an actuarial model, 
frequency is stochastic and has to be expressed as a probability distribution. Naturally, the state space 
for the frequency distribution should be a subset of all non-negative integers. Empirical evidence 
suggests (BCBS, 2006) that operational loss frequency can be modelled using one of the following: the 
Poisson distribution, the negative binomial, or the binomial distribution (not discussed in this thesis). 
The Quantitative Impact Study 4 (QIS-4)20 submissions showed that many of these distributions were 
reported as used by financial institutions (De Fontnouvelle, Rosengren and Jordan, 2004; Dutta and 
Perry, 2006).  
 
2.5.1 The Poisson distribution  
 
Frachot, A., Moudoulaud, O. and Roncalli, T. (2003) highlight key characteristics of the Poisson 
distribution, which are its one-parameter distribution; the mean and variance of the Poisson distribution 
are both equal to . The sum of two independently distributed Poisson random variables is still a Poisson 
random variable, with its mean parameter being the sum of the means of the two component 
distributions. In actuarial modelling, the Poisson distribution is preferred in modelling because of 
inherent analytical qualities as mentioned above (De Fontnouvelle et al., 2004). This was also 
confirmed and applied by Mignola and Ugoccioni (2006) and Dutta and Perry (2006). 
 
2.5.2 The negative binomial distribution  
 
The key referral article for this section is Moscadelli (2004). The Negative binomial is an alternative to 
the Poisson distribution when the observed mean of the losses being considered is less than the observed 
variance of the considered losses. The negative binomial distribution arises from a series of Bernoulli 
trials that is, having a series of random events until a possible outcome can occur (usually denoted 
success or failure). In practice, if there is variability in the frequency, then the best alternative is to use 
the negative binomial distributions as compared to the Poisson distribution. The negative binomial 
distribution is also more flexible when compared to the Poisson distribution, since it has two parameters. 
If some volatility is introduced to the mean parameter of the Poisson distribution, a negative binomial 
distribution is attained (hence, as the volatility gradually dies down, the distribution moves towards a 
Poisson distribution, in the limit).   
 
 





2.6 Modelling severity 
 
De Fontnouvelle et al. (2004) and Dutta and Perry (2006) identify prevalent methods for fitting the 
severity distribution, i.e. Exponential, Lognormal, Lognormal-gamma, Log-logistic, Weibull, 
Generalized Pareto, and g-and-h distributions. Notwithstanding that there are numerous distributions 
which one can consider in modelling severities, in this study the only considered distributions in 
modelling the loss severities are the Lognormal, Weibull, Burr, Generalized Pareto and Gamma 
distributions. These were deemed to be more stable (Dutta and Perry, 2006). Additionally, they can be 
used with small samples (from 25 data points and above).  
 
The lognormal distribution is a continuous probability distribution of a random number that has a 
normally distributed natural logarithm. Thus a positive random variable 𝑋 =  (𝑥1, 𝑥2 … 𝑥𝑛) follows a 
lognormal distribution if 𝑌 =  (𝑦1, 𝑦2 … 𝑦𝑛)  =  (𝑙𝑛(𝑥1), 𝑙𝑛(𝑥2) …  𝑙𝑛(𝑥𝑛))  =  𝑙𝑛(𝑋) follows a 
normal distribution. The Burr distribution is a three – parameter distribution. It is less stable but more 
flexible, and requires at least 100 data points to be used safely. It can be used to model fat tail 
distributions when necessary. The use of many of these distributions for operational risk severity 
modelling was also proposed and detailed by Mignola and Ugoccioni (2006). The probability density 
functions (pdf) and the cumulative distribution functions (cdf) of the distributions considered in this 
study are discussed by Dutta and Perry (2006). 
 
2.6.1 Distribution fitting  
 
Operational loss data is almost always collated beyond a certain threshold (data truncation – see BCBS, 
2006). This presents a challenge to modeling loss severity, as most loss severity distributions were 
developed to model data sets where there is no threshold (i.e. where the data is collected from the ground 
up), except for a very few well-defined distributions that were developed to model truncated data sets 
(such as the Pareto distribution). These distributions cannot be used in their original form to fit truncated 
data. One plausible analytic solution to resolve this problem is maximum likelihood estimation 
(Ergashev, 2008).  
 
2.6.1.1 Maximum likelihood estimation  
 
Ergashev (2008) compares the maximum likelihood estimation performance against three other 
estimation methods that can be used in fitting operational risk models to loss data. Maximum likelihood 
estimation (MLE) is a process used to fit empirical data to a theoretical distribution. Given a pre-
specified theoretical distribution, MLE is used to ascertain the set of parameters which have the 




function is the density function, however in instances where loss data is truncated, an adjustment is 
required. Ergashev (2008) highlights that the typical collection threshold is in some instances set as 
high as US$10,000, and sometimes even higher, whilst Shevchenko and Wuthrich (2006) quote 
US$20,000 for this threshold (see also Frachot et al., 2003 for a detailed rationale on the inverse 
relationship between an increase in collection threshold leading to a deep in the capital charge). 
However, in this thesis I do not delve further on the underlying reasons for such thresholds, except to 
highlight that in operational risk, left truncated data is a norm (Baud, Frachot and Roncalli, 2003). The 
latter authors largely attribute this to loss collection thresholds and/or insurance deductions from the 
losses. The underestimation of parameters leading to underestimation of capital is largely due to fitting 
a probability distribution to the truncated data, and not adjusting for the imposed truncation point (De 
Fontnouvelle, De Jesus-Rueff, Jordan and Rosengren, 2003). 
 
De Fontnouvelle et al. (2004) argue that the MLE method is arguably the most frequently used 
estimation method in current operational risk capital quantification practice.  However, Ergashev (2008) 
highlights that MLE matching accurately measures the bodies of empirical and fitting distributions 
where the likelihood mass is concentrated. Ergashev (2008) reports that for small amounts of data, 
Quantile Distance Method leads other estimation methods, including the MLE, and concludes that the 
reason for the superior performance is due to the Quantile Distance Method focusing on fitting high 
level quantiles, which are more precise estimators of capital.  Additionally, Shevchenko (2011) 
concludes that MLE is indeed useful and widely used, but that is has a drawback, namely that 
asymptotic approximations are in most cases not accurate enough in instances where the data is limited, 
resulting in the distribution of parameter errors that are materially different from normal (hence MLEs 
may have significant bias). The other challenge which is common to all asymptotic results is that when 
using MLE one cannot precisely identify a sample size that is large enough on which to use the 
asymptotic approximation.  
 
2.6.2 Statistical goodness of fit tests 
 
Goodness of fit (GOF) tests are essentially for comparing the fitted distribution to the empirical one. 
This is largely a standard semiparametric procedure to assess the level of distribution fit. For this section 
the tests and their computation referred to, are drawn from Chernobai, Rachev and Fabozzi (2012). 
Lavaud and Leherisse (2014) analysed selection methods, paying particular attention to the mainstream 
properties of these methods used in the LDA. The different distributions considered in this dissertation 
are narrowed down through choosing the one that fits the data best for each business unit and/or risk 
category. The criteria for such a choice are based on some kind of measures of GOF.  There are several 
recognized statistical tests for measuring the GOF. These methods are used to diagnose the quality of 




rejecting or accepting a distribution subject to certain critical values. The respective GOF tests calculate 
a score for a respective distribution, which measures the “overall” difference between the empirical 
distribution and the chosen distribution. In the instance that the score exceeds the critical value, the null 
hypothesis is rejected, essentially implying the empirical data comes from the distribution in question. 
However, if the score is less than the critical value, this suggests that there is no strong evidence to 
reject the null hypothesis (Moscadelli, 2004). The minimum standards relating to GOF tests are found 
in BCBS (2006).  
 
2.6.2.1 The quadratic Anderson-Darling test  
 
Anderson and Darling (1954) pioneered the quadratic Anderson Darling (AD) goodness of fit test. The 
quadratic Anderson Darling (AD) test is derived from the Cramer–von Mises test, and it essentially 
confers a greater weight to the left and right tails of the distributions than to the body (Lavaud and 
Leherisse. 2014). This means that it puts more weight towards the end regions, and therefore emphasizes 
the tail-end fit, resulting in this test being most appropriate for models that depend on the tail-end 
precision (chief of which is the VaR calculation). For a candidate distribution with Fcdf and a set of n 
empirical loss observations, the Anderson –Darling test is calculated using the formula: 
 
TAD = - n - ∑ ( 2 i – 1 ) / n [In ( F (xi) ) – In (1 – F (x n + 1 – i))]  (2.3) 
 
Where n is the total number of observations, and xi’s are the observed empirical data arranged in a non-
decreasing order: x1 ≤  x2   ….. ≤  xn.. Note that the Anderson Darling (AD) Test is extensively discussed 
in Panjer (2006) and applied by Mignola and Ugoccioni (2006) and Ergashev (2008).  
 
2.6.2.2 The modified quadratic Anderson-Darling test  
 
The modified quadratic AD (ADup) test is based on the same principle as the basic AD Test, but has a 
different weighting, which confers a greater weight to the right tails of the distributions (i.e. the biggest 
losses / high severity) (Lavaud and Leherisse, 2014). The modified quadratic Anderson-Darling test is 
generally deemed as being more demanding than the Kolmogorov-Smirnov or Cramer von Mises tests 
(Dutta & Perry, 2006) and is presented as follows:  
 








2.6.2.3 The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test  
 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test measures the differences between the empirical and theoretical 
distributions at the point x where the fit is the worst [encapsulated in the use of the max in the formula 
below] (Moscadelli, 2004). It is thus a local test (Lavaud & Leherisse, 2014). The KS test, extensively 
discussed by Panjer (2006), is calculated as follows: 
 
Tks = max 1 ≤ I ≤ n | F (xi) – I / n |  (2.5) 
 
Where n is the total number of observations, and xi’s are the observed empirical data. One of the good 
features about the KS test is that the distribution of Tks under the null hypothesis is independent of F. It 
can be shown that TKS always observes the same distribution (for fixed sample size n) under the null 
hypothesis. The problem is that this property can also lead to the test being likely to accept wrong 
models (prone in small sample sizes) (Knuth, 1998). As a measure of goodness-of-fit, the KS test does 
not put emphasis of the fit on any specific sub-range of the distribution, and therefore it is generally 
viewed as a measure of overall fit. A given theoretical distribution ranked as the best by the KS test 
may not fit, say, the tail-end region as well as some other distributions. This test was, amongst other, 
used by Mignola and Ugoccioni (2006), and Dutta and Perry (2006). 
 
2.6.2.4 Cramer-Von Mises test 
 
 The quadratic Cramer–Von Mises (CvM) test measures the mean square deviations between the 
empirical distribution and the estimated distribution, with the same weighting for each observation 
(Lavaud and Leherisse, 2014). For a candidate distribution with Fcdf and a set of n empirical loss 
observations, the Cramer-Von Mises test is calculated by the following formula: 
 
TCVM = 1 / 12n + ∑ [ 2i – 1 / 2n – F ( xi ) ]2 |  (2.6) 
 
Where n is the total number of observations, and xi’s are the observed empirical data arranged in a non-
decreasing order: x1 ≤  x2   ….. ≤  xn. The Cramer-Von Mises test thus aims at minimizing the overall 










Table 2.2: Statistical goodness of fit tests advantages and disadvantages 
 
Test Name Advantages  Disadvantages  
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov  
Not dependent on how loss 
data is binned  
 
Tables for critical values and 
associated cumulative 
probabilities are widely 
available  
 
True distribution (null 
hypothesis) more likely to be 
confirmed by the test  
Restricted to continuous distributions  
 
The tail is less sensitive compared to the centre of the 
distribution.  
 
Not a very powerful test: it has less power in detecting 




Not dependent on how loss 
data is binned  
 
Sensitive to the distribution in 
calculating critical values  
 
Emphasizes the fit of the tail 
of the distribution  
Restricted to continuous distributions 
 
Tables for critical values and associated cumulative 
probabilities are only available for select distributions 
since it depends on the actual distribution under test.  
Cramer-Von 
Mises  
Not dependent on how loss 
data is binned  
 
Restricted to continuous distributions  
 
Tables for critical values and associated cumulative 
probabilities are not available.  
 
2.6.3 Modelling distribution selection  
 
Of the distributions that are considered in modelling severity, at least two distributions can pass the 
GOF test. An extra tool to support the model selection process is the Akaike information criterion (AIC).  
 
2.6.3.1 Akaike information criterion  
 
BCBS (2006) points out that though diagnostic tools such as those discussed in previous sections 
provide a view on the quality of fit between the data and each distribution, there are instances where no 
conclusive decision is given regarding which of the proposed distributions is the ideal. Additionally, 
the BCBS (2006) highlights that GOF tests are considerably sensitive when it comes to sample size and 
the number of parameters being estimated. In the instance that the GOF tests are unclear on the ideal 
distribution, the BCBS recommends that financial institutions consider selection methods that use the 
relative performance of the distributions at different confidence levels. The named examples of 
selection methods in the text are the Akaike Information Criterion, Likelihood Ratio, the Schwarz 





The AIC selects a model that minimizes the Kullback-Leibler distance (which will be zero if the model 
and data are identical) between the model and the actual data set. The criterion selects the model that 
best fits the data with the least possible number of parameters (Robert, 2001). In the general case, the 
AIC is;  
 
AIC = 2k – 2 In ( L ) | (2.7) 
 
k is the number of parameters in the statistical model, and L is the maximized value of the likelihood 
function for the estimated model (Afambo, 2005). Thus, AIC rewards goodness of fit and penalties that 
increase with the number of parameters. Over fitting is discouraged in this way (Tsai and Hurvich, 
1988).  
 
2.7 Scenario analysis  
 
Shevchenko (2011:112) defines scenario analysis as a process where senior management analyse past 
events experienced within the bank and by other banks (including near miss losses), identify risks that 
are idiosyncratic to the risk profile of the bank, as well as consider current and planned controls in the 
banks, etc. Scenario analysis permits the completion of two objectives, which are to estimate the VaR 
through quantifying expert opinion when loss data is insufficient or unstable to provide sufficient, 
accurate and reliable VaR, and to independently validate the EL, UL and VaR estimates that have been 
produced through a loss data based model. For this purpose, they allow validating the forward-looking 
aspect of the LDA (BCBS, 2006). The former objectives are usually accomplished by estimating the 
shape of the frequency and severity distributions (Shevchenko, 2011). 
 
2.7.1 Scenario analysis fundamentals  
 
This section heavily relies on the seminal work by Shevchenko (2011). The ILD profiles of most 
institutions show that banks do not have enough losses that can have major impact21. Scenario analysis 
addresses this, while also trying to be forward looking in terms of these major risks. The main objective 
of scenario analysis is to obtain a precise and distinct quantification of major risks that have been 
identified. This focuses on major risk events identified in Risk Control and Self–Assessments (RCSA), 
ILD analysis, and ELD analysis. The output of this process needs to make business sense after it has 
been processed using internal models. The output of this process includes the estimates of frequency 
and severity distributions that will be processed in internal modelling.  
 





Because the frequency and severities of these losses over the next year is unknown, it is prudent to do 
a Monte Carlo simulation when building an aggregate loss distribution (Shevchenko, 2011). The 
challenge is that there is no prior knowledge that exists to allow one to strictly set the frequency at one, 
and to extract the 99.9 percentile from the most appropriate severity distribution. Hence, by building an 
aggregated loss distribution using the Monte Carlo simulation method, it is possible to address this 
uncertainty and have some conservatism should things be worse than anticipated by the experts. The 
Monte Carlo simulation provides a layer of conservatism compared to when the VaR is extracted 
directly from the parametric distribution (Frachot et al., 2003).  
 
2.7.2 Scenario analysis modelling  
 
The experts’ estimations need to be transformed to a loss distribution that will give a capital measure 
at the 99.9% confidence level (similar to the 1 in a 1000 years extrapolated estimate, over a one-year 
holding period). The methodology used to convert the experts’ subjective distribution to a distribution 
highly depends on the methodology used to elicit the data from the experts. These methods range from 
the fixed percentile, fixed quartiles and the duration approach. Only the duration approach will be 
discussed here (see Frachot et al., 2003). 
 
- Duration approach 
 
Frachot et al., (2003) introduced a methodology of using durations, which was later improved by 
Alderweireld, Garcia and Léonard (2006) to ensure that it relates to business, and can comfortably be 
employed by experts. The same methodology (with some variation) was also described by Peters and 
Hübner (2009), and Steinhoff and Baule (2006). The end result of this method is similar to that of the 
fixed percentile or quartile. The aim is to build a subjective loss distribution with potential loss amounts, 
with probabilities based on business experts’ intuition, their experience and understanding of the 
business. The difference between this methodology and the other two is that, it allows for the 
information to be elicited in a more qualitative and easy to understand method to the business experts. 
This allows for elicitation of information that is of better quality, as experts can understand the questions 
from this methodology better than the other two methodologies (fixed and quantiles). Additionally, it 
allows for more consistent, accurate and reliable scenario data that can be used for operational risk 
capital estimation. It also promotes ownership of the scenario data and thus ownership of the capital 
estimates that results from the scenario analysis process.  
 
Frachot et al. (2003) proposed that a potential loss amount from the experts be elicited with its 
corresponding probability of occurrence. An average duration (duration) is defined as the average 




to provide estimate amount x for which it would take d years on average for a loss greater than the x 
amount to materialise. Hence, in building the subjective loss distribution, the experts will provide a loss 
amount for each of the given durations. Alderweireld et al. (2006) recommended that at least three sets 
of data consisting of 𝑥 and d (buckets) must be provided by the experts in order to calculate a meaningful 
capital amount. This number is directly related to the number of parameters that are being estimated.  
 
Table 2.3: Duration approach  
 
Duration 1 10 20 50 
Estimated Loss Amount X1 X2 X3 X4 
 
Figure 2.2: Duration approach22  
 
   
 
2.8 Robustness tests  
 
Robustness tests are used to assess the stability of the model. A model is considered to be robust when 
it is not too specific in its representation of the data sample. Robustness tests are used to avoid having 
to change the model for each new data sample. Two kinds of test can be performed to assess the 
robustness, namely bootstrapping and stress testing. Additional context can be found in BCBS (2006), 




                                                          





2.8.1 Bootstrap testing 
 
Originally developed by Efron (1979), the essence of bootstrapping is that one can have an 
understanding of a sample through resampling the data set under investigation, estimating the 
parameters of each individual sample to assess the variability in the parameters (Frachot et al., 2003). 
For a given data set, the data is re-sampled randomly a large number of times. Each re-sampled data set 
is fitted, and the volatility of the derived parameters of the candidate function is computed. The model 
is considered to be robust if the volatility is under a certain arbitral quantum. As a further test, specific 
central parameters (average values of the parameters obtained from the several fitted samples) may be 
adjusted with the volatility, and the VaR recalculated and compared with the VaR calculated with the 
unadjusted central parameters (the bootstrapped VaR) (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993).  
 
2.8.2 Stress testing  
 
This test assesses the stability of the model to outliers. The model is stressed by adding twice the 
maximum loss amount to the original sample and refitting the parameters. The VaR is then recalculated, 
with the latter being called the stressed VaR. If the ratio of the stressed VaR to the original VaR is less 
than 2, then the model is considered robust (BCBS, 2006). 
 
2.9 VaR calculation using the loss distribution approach  
 
The work by Shevchenko (2010) forms the basis of this section. The calculation of ALD for operational 
risk quantification typically uses one of the following three methods: Monte-Carlo simulation as 
suggested in Klugman et al. (1998), Panjer's Recursive Algorithm (Panjer, 2006), and Fourier 
Transformation (BCBS, 2006). In all three methods, smooth theoretical distributions must be fitted to 
match the loss data, especially for severity, since empirical distributions from limited loss data are 
unlikely to generate robust figures. Due to certain characteristics of loss data for operational risk 
quantification, these methods need to be re-evaluated and compared so that informed decisions can be 
made to determine when and how to use them. Of the three methods, Monte Carlo simulation is the 
most practical and reliable. In addition, simulation seems to be most flexible and its logic most easily 
understood and defensible (see Frachot et al., 2003). 
 
2.9.1 Monte Carlo simulation  
 
Whenever a closed form solution is difficult to obtain, simulation is the first option that researchers 
consider in most instances. This applies to the calculation of the aggregate loss distribution modelled 




frequency and loss severity. The simulation engine simply mimics this logical path by first generating 
an event frequency number N, and then generating individual losses N times according to some pre-
specified severity distribution. A simulated aggregate loss is obtained by simply summing up the N 
individual losses. This is just one simulated outcome. By iterating this process many times one can 
obtain a collection of simulated outcomes that may be regarded as a sample representation of the actual 
aggregate loss distribution from which important statistics such as the mean, median, variance and 
percentiles can be calculated. It has been shown that 1,000,000 iterations produces reasonably stable 
results at the 99.9% confidence level (Frachot et al., 2003; Dutta and Perry, 2006). However, the 
stability of the results will depend not only on the number of iterations, but also on the error surrounding 
the frequency and severity parameter estimates. Monte Carlo simulation provides a robust, flexible way 
to perform distribution integration and aggregation to arrive at global loss distributions (Dutta and 
Perry, 2006). Simulation methods for aggregation were also proposed and used by Mignola and 
Ugoccioni (2006). De Fontnouvelle et al. (2004) and Bocker and Kluppelberg (2005) agree that 
simulation is seen as a flexible route which can be made to incorporate new logical steps (examples of 
which are insurance, or diversification) in loss generation that would alter the resultant distribution. 
 
2.10 Regulatory capital  
 
The regulatory capital is defined: the VaR at 99.9% (VaR = EL + UL). Both EL and UL are used in the 
regulatory capital quantification. For regulatory capital, the 99.9th percentile is always used (BCBS, 
2006; ORX, 2010), while other percentiles (confidence intervals) may be used for an economic capital 
(Basel II Pillar 2) calculation, depending on the target credit rating of the bank (Frachot et al., 2003).  
 
2.11 Chapter summary  
 
The structure and approach to the literature review is premised on Sundmacher (2007)’s case study 
based analysis. Sundmacher (2007) assesses the case of a financial institution moving from the BIA to 
the TSA, using hypothesized data and he demonstrates that there might be little incentive for financial 
institutions to move from BIA to TSA. The underlying thought put forward by Basel II is that as 
financial institutions move from TSA to AMA, a priori lower regulatory capital charge is attained as 
reward. Francesco and Ardita (2012) test the validity of this underlying thought, and in the process 
assess the profitability of using AMA through a cost–benefit analysis for Albanian financial institutions. 
The decision as to which quantification method to opt for is viewed as a cost / benefit trade-off between 
the developmental costs, the data collection, and collation costs, against the benefits of regulatory 
capital relief. Kaiser and Kohne (2006) query the AMA assumption that the summation of high 
percentiles of VaR is an ideal indicator of operational risk within a bank as this means that the worst 




correlation across Operational Risk Cells (ORCs) be assumed valid, then the capital charges of the 
various ORCs should be summed, and in the process effectively resulting in a higher capital charge 
than that determined by the simpler approaches. In contrast El Arif, F. Z. and Hinti, S. (2014) state that 
AMA methods lead to an a priori lower capital charge in comparison to BIA, and additionally state that 
though the gross implementation costs of AMA may be deemed as high, its marginal cost is not. 
Laycock (2014) takes cognisance of the cons surrounding AMA, but is of the opinion that despite these, 
AMA models are still preferable to TSA and AMA, especially in relation to risk sensitivity and risk 
management support. 
 
The complexities in the quantification of operational risk using AMA are highlighted as data shortage, 
the nature of operational risk, and the lack of a strong risk sensitive exposure measure in operational 
risk modelling. Additionally, risk data gathered during an economic expansion is deemed to be 
unsuitable to be used during a recession. Some of the qualitative drawbacks of AMA include being able 
to do just as much risk management as AMA when using simpler approaches; the fact that only large 
international banks are permitted to use AMA, thus giving them unfair advantage compared to smaller 
competitor banks; there being no guarantee of a capital benefit post gradating to AMA, and the 
exorbitant development costs for the internal models. Notwithstanding the above, some expected 
benefits of gradating to AMA are highlighted as: elimination of regulatory arbitrage (as the capital 
charge is entirely based on the individual’s bank risk exposure to operational losses); an increased level 
of flexibility in incorporating innovation in the quantification process (internal models); AMA’s 
consideration of risk controls, diversification benefits, as well as risk transfer contracts (insurance), 
which effectively reduces the capital charge; that it encourages banks to improve risk management 
processes and procedures, and  a reduced compliance cost owing to alignment between regulatory and 
economic capital. Francesco and Ardita (2012) conclude, in agreement  with Nash (2003), that financial 
institutions should not take it as a given that changing to AMA  will definitely result in a capital benefit, 
but should rather explore all available quantification methodologies in a bid to identify the ideal method 
that takes the idiosyncrasies of the particular bank into account. 
 
In summarizing the technical section of this chapter, I do so as follows: Extreme operational risks are 
risks which occur when unexpected circumstances prevail (largely regarded as tail events), e.g. owing 
to significant failures in the control environment, or abnormal increases in business volumes / values. 
In the general case, these losses tend to be low frequency and high impact risks (e.g. massive frauds or 
rogue trading). Basel II regulatory guidelines for AMA state that a financial institution is required to 
ensure that its quantification method for capital captures potentially tail loss events, and that it is 
comparable to a one year holding period and a 99.9 percentile confidence interval. Measuring the 
regulatory capital requirement using VaR aligns with this requirement. A bank that intends on adopting 




use of the key data elements (ILD, ELD, scenario analysis, and BEICFs) in its risk measurement system.  
In quantifying operational risk, two variables need to be defined, namely the frequency and the severity 
of the event, where frequency refers to the number of events that occur within a given time period. 
Empirical evidence has thus far suggested that operational loss frequency can be modelled using: the 
Poisson distribution, the negative binomial distribution, or the binomial distribution. With regard to 
modelling severity, in this thesis particular focus is placed only on the following distributions; the 
Lognormal, Weibull, Burr, Generalized Pareto, Pareto and Gamma distributions. To fit empirical data 
to a theoretical distribution the Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) technique is used. The 
statistical tests discussed in the chapter are the Anderson-Darling, Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test, and 
Cramer-Von Mises tests. In instances that the GOF test passes all two distributions, an additional 
screening criterium to support the model selection process can be applied, namely the AIC. Scenario 
analysis is a way to assess plausible extreme events on the bank’s operations, and assign likelihood and 
severity estimations to the range of possible outcomes. Scenarios are forward-looking and provide 
coverage mainly for the extreme tail loss events the bank has not yet experienced, but which are likely 
to negatively impact its solvency. The Duration approach forms the basis for the estimation of the 
scenario data that is finally used in capital calculation. After severity buckets for each duration have 
been estimated, two distributions are considered in determining a distribution that would best describe 
the loss distribution. These points (buckets) are used as inputs to a weighted least-squares 
approximation to determine the distribution that would best describe the severity estimates. To assess 
the stability of the model, robustness tests are used, which avoids having to change the model for each 
new data sample. Two kinds of test can be performed to assess the robustness: Bootstrapping and Stress 
testing. The chapter concludes by looking at the calculation of aggregate loss distributions for 
operational risk quantification, typically using one of the following three methods: Monte-Carlo 
simulation, Panjer's Recursive Algorithm and Fourier Transform. Of the three methods, Monte-Carlo 
simulation is practical and reliable. In addition, simulation seems to be most flexible and its logic most 
easily understood and defensible. The resultant regulatory capital is defined as the VaR at 99.9%. The 











The chapter explains the methodology employed in this study. This chapter gives an overview of the 
research design, data collection methods, research population, data sample, data presentation and 
research analysis employed in this study. Although a comprehensive methodology to the subject matter 
was developed in chapter two, the research design gives in extensive detail the – nuts and bolts – of 
executing the proposed approach.  Overall, the research design emphasises the calculation process in 
quantifying the capital requirements using both AMA and TSA, and highlights the AMA benefit as the 
difference between the two calculated quanta.  
 
3.2 Data collection methods, research population 
 
I test the validity of Basel II’s underlying thought as detailed in 2.2 of the preceding chapter, and in the 
process assess the profitability of using AMA through a cost–benefit analysis for South African 
financial institutions. In doing so a case study structure on one instance of data has been adopted owing 
to the fact that historical data is often not available. The net effect is that uniform historical data upon 
which operational risk capital charges can be built is lacking. In the thesis, I delve into the underlying 
operational risk profile for the subject matter bank to thoroughly review across its range of business 
activities in order to identify and estimate the model input requirements, here proposed. Nonetheless a 
consented effort has been made to shy away from elaborate descriptive stats in a bid to protect the 
identity of the South African subject matter bank.  
 
3.3 Data Analysis  
 
This section aims to provide a descriptive overview of the data across some of the metrics outlined in 
Chapter 2. ILD and ELD are among the four data elements that a bank using AMA in managing and 
measuring operational risk needs to use. ILD portrays a good view of the bank’s risk profile, and hence 
it can be used as a foundation when measuring the risk and ensuring that the outcomes of the risk 
measurement process are related to the current risks and emerging risks that are pointed out by the ILD. 
The ILD analysed for this thesis is based on gross loss amounts before any recoveries, and covers a 
period of 5.5 years, from 2007 to June 2012. The ILD data was sourced from one of South Africa’s 
financial institutions (Data extracted from a SAS depository, onto Excel), with all relevant sanction 




(showing range, number of losses, cumulative loss amount within the range and number of losses within 
the range): -  
 
Figure 3.1: ILD Loss Ranges23 
 
Loss amount range ('000) No of losses Loss amount Ave loss amount 
10 - 35 8 896 171 812 168 19 313 
35 - 60 1 830 82 324 094 44 986 
60 - 155 1 271 115 350 562 90 756 
155 - 300 363 77 573 463 213 701 
300 - 600 214 90 909 728 424 812 
600 - 1000 78 59 319 435 760 506 
1000 - 3000 84 140 014 007 1 666 833 
3000 - 6000 16 73 787 987 4 611 749 
6000 - 12000 12 101 971 091 8 497 591 
12000 - 24000 7 120 114 097 17 159 157 
24000 - 90000 9 298 801 790 33 200 199 
>= 90000 1 97 892 758 97 892 758 
Total 12 781 1 429 871 180 111 875 
 
Three event types contribute 94.4% to the total number of losses. These event types are External Fraud 
(78.2%), Execution, Delivery and Process Management (13.8%), and Clients, Products and Business 
Practices (2.4%). Moreover, 83% of the loss amounts come from these three event types. However, the 
major contributor to this amount is the EF (33.4%), followed by EDPM (35%) and CPBP (15%). Of 
the total losses that were used, 94% of these losses have a value less than R155 000 and 84% of these 
losses are from Retail. As the loss amount increases, the operational risk profiles of the differing 
businesses changes. That is, the number of losses in Retail decreases whereas it increases in business 
units like Business banking, Capital, Corporate and Total finance. This shows that these business units 
are exposed to risks that are more likely to result in tail events. Survivorship bias within the data set, 
and its possible impact on the VaR was not explored as it is beyond the scope of this thesis (though 
discussed in the preceding chapter). Table 3.1 below shows the various business units on the vertical, 
against the Basel II loss event types. The table shows that most of the infrequent events that have higher 
impact are mostly in the CPBP event category and some events are in the EDPM category. These events 
are different from those frequent but low impact events that can be accepted by business as part of their 
predictable, day to day, stable and expected losses that are deemed as a cost of doing business. Most of 
these losses fall under CPBP (29%) in Capital (40% of the 29%) and Total finance (40% of the 29%), 






                                                          




Table 3.1: ILD24  
 
 























34 818 296 
1 832 542 
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84 136 988 
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1 385 033 
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46 010 
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13 834 737 
2 766 947 
1 146 720 
10 702 942 
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1 391 350 
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10 702 942 
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2 933 237 
1 466 618 
1 466 618 
2 916 331 
2 050 204 
1.39791 
158 
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74 384 
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49 149 467 
24 574 734 
24 574 734 
32 152 098 
10 716 012 
0.43606 
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156 849 726 
2 148 626 
27 599 
34 751 929 
























208 768 667 
2 046 752 
34 963 
34 751 929 













40 047 072 
128 769 
29 427 




220 815 814 
833 267 
42 171 
52 004 465 
4 966 768 
5.96060 
65 







501 581 329 
284 504 
30 000 
34 751 929 
1 882 649 
6.61729 
9 996 
466 167 299 
46 635 
21 391 




29 153 536 
205 307 
70 545 




167 754 511 
701 902 
64 054 
97 892 758 
6 358 880 
9.05950 
12 781 
1 429 871 180 
111 875 
22 582 
97 892 758 
1 363 070 
12.18389 
                                                          




- External Loss Data 
 
In assessing the ILD data, I found that in most cases the type of profile that it depicts relates more to 
the expected loss (EL) than it does to the unexpected loss (UL). The ILD consists mostly of small losses 
(in terms of severity) and fewer losses that would be regarded as tail losses. The ELD is used to address 
some of the gaps that are left by ILD due to its inability to capture tail event risks. In this thesis, ELD 
is not directly incorporated into the model. It is used as an input to the scenario development process 
where it is deemed to be relevant and in benchmarking the ILD data. The benchmarking has been done 
to test alignment between the availed data (of the subject matter bank), and other regional banks that 
are a members of the consortium. For external data, I have used the Operational Riskdata eXchange 
Association (see section 2.4.1.2 for additional detail).  
 
The figures below show different views of gross loss amounts and frequencies for the 7 Basel II event 
types. In constructing the figures below, data from 2004 to October 2011 for the ORX data was 
analysed. The problem with the ORX data is that, it is more quantitative than qualitative as it does not 
give a detailed description of reported losses (due to anonymity), which would allow one to scale the 
losses accordingly. This data has been used to benchmark the operational risk profiles to ensure that all 
possible risks and other emerging risk, if relevant, are considered. ORX has 10 business lines, which 
include all the 8 Basel II business lines and corporate items and private banking as additional business 
lines. In Basel II, private banking is classified under retail banking and I do a similar exercise when 
analysing the ORX data. It should be noted that their event types are named differently, but they can be 
mapped directly to the 7 Basel II event types.  
 
It should be noted that the amount is in Euros and has not been adjusted for inflation. Also, in the data 
presented below, all the credit risk related events and the ones that are flagged as deleted from the 

















                                                          
25 Source: Operational Riskdata eXchange Association (ORX) 
BDSF CPBP DPA EDPM EF EPWS IF Total
Count 29 493 79 1 001 390 259 30 2 281
Sum 2 519 633 36 316 839 6 079 668 79 608 010 27 836 774 20 800 020 2 445 240 175 606 184
Average 86 884 73 665 76 958 79 528 71 376 80 309 81 508 76 986
Median 90 839 69 357 73 661 77 812 65 515 77 606 79 042 74 418
Max 144 217 147 389 142 070 147 517 147 143 147 622 144 525 147 622
Std Dev 34 840 41 799 34 285 37 528 34 745 39 740 37 920 38 291
Vol 0.40                   0.57                   0.45                   0.47                   0.49                   0.49                   0.47                   0.50                   
Count 1 382 1 552 111 19 643 1 006 1 073 188 24 955
Sum 104 778 413 118 135 715 8 208 693 1 514 340 201 75 991 791 82 515 541 14 651 686 1 918 622 040
Average 75 817 76 118 73 952 77 093 75 539 76 902 77 935 76 883
Median 74 125 75 682 71 033 74 923 72 180 75 369 75 050 74 791
Max 147 515 147 577 144 833 147 669 147 377 147 614 147 396 147 669
Std Dev 38 468 40 514 37 885 37 040 32 922 38 230 38 287 37 254
Vol 0.51                   0.53                   0.51                   0.48                   0.44                   0.50                   0.49                   0.48                   
Count 2 229 18 676 2 023 37 923 66 699 15 729 7 314 150 593
Sum 169 429 659 1 454 988 871 152 924 804 2 930 004 825 4 917 728 028 1 261 561 130 47 091 249 10 933 728 566
Average 76 012 77 907 75 593 77 262 73 730 80 206 6 439 72 604
Median 72 101 75 497 72 647 73 663 68 196 80 059 4 393 69 524
Max 147 561 147 670 147 528 147 670 147 666 147 668 147 482 147 670
Std Dev 37 846 35 851 34 364 34 577 32 468 36 427 14 425 36 627
Vol 0.50                   0.46                   0.45                   0.45                   0.44                   0.45                   2.24                   0.50                   
Count 468 4 248 128 9 305 8 264 718 486 23 617
Sum 35 738 601 329 466 466 10 231 305 730 066 926 637 373 354 56 404 185 37 363 844 1 836 644 681
Average 76 365 77 558 79 932 78 460 77 126 78 557 76 880 77 768
Median 72 522 76 744 79 544 77 004 74 335 78 313 74 463 75 735
Max 146 312 147 670 146 518 147 670 147 591 147 459 147 476 147 670
Std Dev 38 155 38 680 35 314 37 192 34 459 38 866 39 491 36 651
Vol 0.50                   0.50                   0.44                   0.47                   0.45                   0.49                   0.51                   0.47                   
Count 249 135 11 1 906 840 54 51 3 246
Sum 20 477 800 9 851 832 827 865 148 018 218 59 115 699 3 717 974 3 888 539 245 897 927
Average 82 240 72 977 75 260 77 659 70 376 68 851 76 246 75 754
Median 81 589 64 524 63 625 73 703 65 205 60 407 76 044 71 458
Max 147 128 147 013 147 176 147 464 147 264 145 089 138 919 147 464
Std Dev 38 644 38 729 47 103 34 696 29 823 42 111 34 405 34 362
Vol 0.47                   0.53                   0.63                   0.45                   0.42                   0.61                   0.45                   0.45                   
Count 208 441 35 8 317 655 251 61 9 968
Sum 16 883 685 33 346 007 2 427 725 656 264 609 50 216 438 20 112 364 4 779 245 784 030 073
Average 81 172 75 615 69 364 78 906 76 666 80 129 78 348 78 655
Median 77 287 71 623 58 952 76 489 71 267 77 996 81 912 76 042
Max 147 135 147 651 143 777 147 658 147 098 147 623 146 625 147 658
Std Dev 36 058 37 986 39 600 36 103 30 101 39 725 38 379 35 954
Vol 0.44                   0.50                   0.57                   0.46                   0.39                   0.50                   0.49                   0.46                   
Count 190 1 051 25 4 211 126 270 91 5 964
Sum 14 229 081 82 130 099 1 617 348 327 861 044 9 579 846 20 288 097 6 936 326 462 641 841
Average 74 890 78 145 64 694 77 858 76 031 75 141 76 223 77 572
Median 71 417 77 158 60 303 76 001 68 919 74 964 70 434 75 784
Max 145 964 147 536 146 635 147 627 146 601 147 171 147 504 147 627
Std Dev 36 271 37 682 38 043 36 643 37 657 39 008 43 822 37 071
Vol 0.48                   0.48                   0.59                   0.47                   0.50                   0.52                   0.57                   0.48                   
Count 147 6 294 23 3 716 635 1 245 480 12 540
Sum 10 591 355 498 159 751 1 572 808 287 989 006 49 266 990 97 861 633 37 704 357 983 145 900
Average 72 050 79 148 68 383 77 500 77 586 78 604 78 551 78 401
Median 68 659 80 041 67 159 74 276 75 793 78 943 76 390 77 409
Max 147 601 147 604 142 105 147 589 147 509 147 660 147 487 147 660
Std Dev 34 799 39 402 38 618 33 976 34 591 39 256 41 457 37 659
Vol 0.48                   0.50                   0.56                   0.44                   0.45                   0.50                   0.53                   0.48                   
Count 169 635 326 1 623 425 2 675 84 5 937
Sum 13 437 087 51 255 801 26 646 781 125 453 048 33 951 550 213 907 717 6 159 178 470 811 162
Average 79 509 80 718 81 739 77 297 79 886 79 966 73 324 79 301
Median 73 708 82 501 83 153 75 682 75 470 81 205 74 192 79 494
Max 146 990 147 494 147 208 147 593 146 858 147 457 144 244 147 593
Std Dev 37 950 38 216 37 204 37 816 32 758 39 512 39 634 38 309
Vol 0.48                   0.47                   0.46                   0.49                   0.41                   0.49                   0.54                   0.48                   
Count 5 071 33 525 2 761 87 645 79 040 22 274 8 785 239 101
Sum 388 085 314 2 613 651 381 210 536 997 6 799 605 887 5 861 060 470 1 777 168 661 161 019 664 17 811 128 374
Average 76 530 77 961 76 254 77 581 74 153 79 787 18 329 74 492
Median 73 207 76 415 73 276 74 797 68 942 79 740 5 193 71 553
Max 147 601 147 670 147 528 147 670 147 666 147 668 147 504 147 670
Std Dev 37 887 37 371 35 140 35 746 32 704 37 273 33 819 36 848















































































ORX shows a profile that is more similar to the ILD profile discussed above. EDPM (38.2% - loss 
amount and 36.7% frequency) leads the top three event types, followed by EF and CPBP. 
Unsurprisingly, retail banking contributed 43.3% to the number of losses in the EDPM event category. 
Similar to ILD data discussed above, retail banking contributed 84.4% to the total number EF losses. 
This can be attributed to the nature of the business and the vulnerabilities that exist in the card business 
and other retail products. 
 
- Inputs into the scenario fitting process 
 
In analysing LDA, the fact that 84% of the losses are below R155, 000 shows that the internal data has 
an insufficient quantum of catastrophic losses. The loss experience of the subject matter bank as shown 
in the composition of the data certainly failed to provide a fully comprehensive sense of the range of 
potential operational risk loss events experienced / that could be experienced, and hence emphasizing 
the need for techniques that extend the distribution curve beyond the loss experience of the financial 
institution in question. In this thesis, this shortcoming was addressed by not only modelling the ILD, 
but by modelling both the ILD and scenarios (which are based on a hypothetical example). The use of 
hypothetical data in operational risk quantification is not unusual, a case in point is the Sundmacher 
(2007) paper. An alternative solution to redressing the lack of tail loss events (low frequency, high 
severity losses) within an internal data set is the convolution of external data with internal data using 
mixture models (Extreme Value Theory).  
 
As such, owing to the fact that in this thesis hypothetical data has been used to calibrate the scenario 
buckets, the frequency and severities of these losses over the next year is unknown (and this is the case 
in practice). It is thus prudent to do a Monte Carlo simulation when building an aggregate loss 
distribution (Shevchenko, 2011), as detailed later in this chapter. The building of an aggregated loss 
distribution using the Monte Carlo simulation method addresses the uncertainty. The Monte Carlo 
simulation provides a layer of conservatism compared to when the VaR is extracted directly from the 
parametric distribution (Frachot et al., 2003) 
 
For scenarios the severity buckets are fitted using the duration approach (see section 2.7.2 for additional 












Scenario Title Duration Buckets  
1 in 1 1 in 10 1 in 20 1 in 50 
1 Litigation Claims  500,000   2,000,000   10,000,000   30,000,000  
2 Processing Error  1,000,000   5,600,000   7,700,000   10,000,000  
3 Fraudulent transfer of funds  2,000,000   5,000,000   10,000,000   18,000,000  
4 Fraudulent transfer of funds  200,000   3,000,000   10,000,000   25,000,000  
5 Breaching exchange controls  13,950,000   18,600,000   47,000,000   90,000,000  
6 Trading errors  973,134   3,600,000   20,000,000   30,000,000  
7 Pay away errors  2,200,000   6,000,000   12,000,000   20,000,000  
8 Unauthorised Trading  1,000,000   3,378,000   5,000,000   16,454,000  
9 Litigation Claims  1,200,000   8,000,000   25,000,000   45,000,000  
10 Execution error   1,000,000   2,500,000   20,000,000   40,000,000  
11 External Fraud  450,000   2,000,000   20,000,000   35,000,000  
12 Internal Fraud  500,000   2,500,000   20,000,000   50,000,000  
13 Legal Litigation  500,000   2,400,000   5,100,000   30,000,000  
14 Incorrectly charging clients   3,000,000   14,000,000   28,000,000   70,000,000  
15 Rogue foreclosure attorney   3 000 000   10,000,000   20,000,000   35,000,000  
16 Misappropriation of client funds   575,000   2,100,000   6,200,000   20,000,000  
17 Unapproved Products  400,000   5,000,000   7,500,000   10,000,000  
18 Execution Errors: Misdeals  200,000   1,100,000   2,000,000   50,00,000  
19 Redemptions  123,763   2,379,001   3,463,825   4,020,880  
20 Unauthorised movement of funds  1,500,000   5,500,000   8,000,000   12,000,000  
21 IT system failure  221,111   1,000,000   4,000,000   20,000,000  
22 Damage to building and premises  6,500,00   5,400,000   28,500,000   56,500,000  
23 Incorrect employment practices  2,000,000   3,500,000   7,500,000   9,000,000  
24 Money laundering regulations  10,000,000   30,000,000   50,000,000   100,000,000  
25 Tax-related operational risks  2,500,000   20,000,000   40,000,000   53,000,000  
26 Information Security  3,000,000   6,000,000   20,000,000   40,000,000  
27 Unavailability of system(s)  1,300,000   10,000,000   14,578,860   32,000,000  
 
3.3.1 The standardised approach (TSA) data  
 
See table 3.4 to see the three year GI numbers used for this thesis, as so extracted from the financial 
statements of the subject matter bank. The beta for each business line is pre-determined by the BCBS, 







                                                          




Table 3.4: Gross operating income and beta factors  
 
 Dec-10 Dec-11 Dec-12 Risk Exposure 
Corporate Finance   740 044 332.66   1 525 869 278.45   1 775 550 461.58     1 347 154 690.90  
Trading and Sales 10 870 864 744.54    6 751 847 621.24   14 525 727 666.39    10 716 146 677.39  
Retail Brokerage  148 936 228.28   168 120 304.65   493 893 766.00     270 316 766.31  
Commercial Bank  7 294 870 520.95   7 775 609 760.61   8 760 414 829.46    7 943 631 703.67  
Retail Banking 7 731 890 019.81   13 917 532 234.48     7 842 215 813.27    9 830 546 022.52  
Payment and Sett 25 389 715.73   75 499 599.29   85 465 748.96     62 118 354.66  
Agency Services     311 326 553.35     289 863 006.14   112 968 561.29    238 052 706.93  
Asset Management  252 003 636.33       66 427.72     454 776.30     84 174 946.78  
Insurance  (1 863 676.81)           150 273.90           -         150 273.90  




This section aims to address the methodology to be applied in this study, as well as review other 
methodologies applied in previous related studies.  
 
3.4.1 Methodologies used in previous studies 
 
Dutta and Perry (2006) use three different techniques to model the severity distribution in operational 
risk quantification as follows: Parametric Distribution Fitting (LDA), a method of Extreme Value 
Theory (EVT), and capital estimation, based on Non-Parametric Empirical Sampling. Dutta and Perry 
(2006) highlight that in Parametric Distribution Fitting the underlying assumption is that the data is 
assumed to follow some specific parametric model. In determining this parametric model, the respective 
parameters are estimated in such a way that the model fits the underlying distribution of the data in 
some ideal manner. EVT is considered a discipline that largely deals with large operational losses. The 
final technique is Empirical Sampling / Historical simulation, which is largely drawing at random from 
an actual data set. Dutta and Perry (2006) provide further an indication of relative popularity among the 
three options within the financial institutions they studied27. Moscadelli (2004) found that EVT 
appeared to be a popular tool used in better understanding large operational risk losses (additionally 
referred to in the penultimate chapter of this thesis as areas of further study), largely due to its attention 
to the tail. However, EVT is not to be seen as the perfect solution as there are specific conditions which 
are required for its ideal application, and moreover there are far-reaching criticisms of EVT which is 
fully detailed in literature (see for example, Embrechts et al., 1997; Diebold, Schuermann and 
Stroughair, 1998; and Embrechts, Lindskog and McNeil, 2003).  
                                                          
27 For a comprehensive source on the application of EVT to finance and insurance, see Embrechts, Kluppelberg & Mikosch (1997) and  




Shevchenko and Wuthrich (2006) extensively applied the Bayesian Inference Technique within the 
context of operational risk, which is an alternate to the methods discussed by Dutta and Perry (2006), 
and Moscadelli (2004). The key fundamentals relating to Bayesian inference is that it is a statistical 
technique used in fusing expert opinions into data analysis. Berger (1985) gives a good overview of 
Bayesian inference method whilst Bühlmann and Gisler (2005) do an equally exceptional job on 
credibility theory (a closely related subject). Shevchenko and Wuthrich (2006) detail how Bayesian 
Inferences essentially allow for structural modelling, where expert opinions are incorporated into the 
analysis via specifying distributions (prior distributions) for model parameters. These are updated with 
new data as it becomes available. At any point in time, the expert may reassess the prior distributions, 
given the availability of new information (for example, when new policy control is introduced), that 
will incorporate this information into a model. Shevchenko and Wuthrich (2006) report that Bayesian 
Inference is hardly used in practice, though they do note that Cruz (2002) mentions it in passing. 
 
3.4.2 Methodologies used in this study 
 
The choice of using LDA in this thesis is premised on the understanding that LDA is one of the most 
commonly used actuarial modelling techniques. Various quantitative and qualitative aspects of LDA 
modelling are discussed by King (2001), Cruz (2002), Panjer (2006) and Shevchenko and Wuthrich 
(2006). The LDA was essentially developed to make better use of loss data when modelling cumulative 
loss exposure, by initially recognising that the aggregate loss distribution consists of individual events. 
This distribution can therefore be described in terms of the frequency of events and the respective loss 
severity (Opdyke, 2014). Dutta and Perry (2006) provide a mathematical illustration by denoting the 
number (or “frequency”) of losses occurring over a specified time period [0, t] with N (t), and the 
individual loss (or “severity”) amounts by x1 x2 x3… The random variable describing the Aggregate Loss 
statistic is then determined as follows:  
 
AggL = ∑ xi  (3.1) 
 
Lavaud and Leherisse (2014) mention the assumptions which conform to the AggL statistic, namely 
that the individual severity random variables are independent of each other and identically distributed 
(i.i.d), and that they are also independent of the frequency random variable. See also Afambo (2005). 
Lavaud and Leherisse (2014) further highlight that for most choices of severity and frequency 
distribution, this distribution cannot be calculated, or is deemed in general difficult to describe, in 
particular in closed form. Numerical methods to overcome this challenge include Monte Carlo 
simulation, Panjer Recursion and fast Fourier Transform methods. These are generally used to calculate 
the aggregate distribution and its relevant statistics, such as the mean and the quantiles. For additional 




three techniques. In practice they find that annual loss distribution is typically found using Monte Carlo 
simulations as opposed to the other two (Panjer and the Fourier). Ultimately the regulatory capital 
charge when using the LDA is attained by taking the empirical quantile at level α = 99:9% of the 
compound distribution, which aligns to risk that occurs every thousand years (Frachot, Moudoulaud 
and Roncalli, 2003; BCBS, 2006).  
 
3.5 Research design 
 
The proposed quantification methodology is grounded in the tenants of various published modelling 
techniques and portions of existing methodologies. However, the overarching methodology is deemed 
to be uniquely suited for the South African financial market. BCBS (2006) specifies that the ILD 
element is the most relevant in the bank’s operational risk measurement system as it is directly related 
to the bank’s current activities, hence taking preference ahead of all other proxies. As an AMA 
candidate bank, the bank is expected to collect loss data under a specified methodology, process and 
guideline framework. The methodology described in this chapter focuses on the use of the data that is 
already collected and saved in a loss depository system, in order to calculate the capitalisation amount. 
The following sections describe the modelling process followed for the quantification of regulatory 
capital charge for operational risk under AMA using a LDA approach, as well as the TSA calculations. 
 
3.6.1 AMA modelling process design  
 
This section opens up with an outline of the AMA modelling process that was followed in conducting 
this research: 
 
- Step A - construction of risk classes  
 
According to BCBS (2006), operational risk is measured against loss event types, namely: clients, 
products and business practices (CPBP); business disruption and systems failures (BDSF); employment 
practices and workplace safety (EPWS); execution, delivery and process management (EDPM); internal 
fraud (IF); external fraud (EF); and damage to physical assets (DPA). The seven loss-event types are 
also classified in line with the business lines which, in the case of the subject matter institution for this 
thesis, are Business Banking, Capital Management, Corporate Banking, Retail Banking and Wealth 
Management. A blend of business line and loss event type then describes a loss class (Ergashev, 2008) 






- Step B – loss data analysis  
 
The data series was analysed to determine if any of the statistical distributions commonly accepted by 
the industry to describe extreme events would fit the data. The statistical tests to ensure that the data 
was stable, robust and sufficient to be used for modelling were conducted and scenario data was fitted 
in Step C. In cases where the ILD did not pass the statistical tests, only the scenario was used to estimate 
the capital requirements. All instances where the ILD did not pass statistical tests, I would proceed to 
step C, however if the ILD passed I would proceed as below. 
 
In essence the following distributions were considered in modelling the loss severities; the Lognormal, 
Weibull, Burr, Generalized Pareto, Pareto and Gamma distributions. Whilst for operational loss 
frequency the three distributions considered were the Poisson distribution, the negative binomial 
distribution and the binomial distribution (De Fontnouvelle et al., 2004). The standard GOF tests were 
done as described in section 2.6.2. When more than one distribution was considered acceptable, two 
distributions that best described the data were accepted. This was done through employing the KS and 
AIC tests (relative tests) (Moscadelli, 2004; Dutta and Perry, 2006). For the best fitting distribution, 
stress testing and bootstrap testing were conducted to test for robustness and stability of the model (as 
detailed in sections previous chapter).  
 
- Step C – scenario analysis:  
 
Scenario analysis is a way to consider the impact of extreme, but nonetheless plausible, events on the 
operations, and assign likelihood and severity estimations to the range of possible outcomes. Scenarios 
are forward-looking and provide coverage mainly for the extreme tail loss events the bank has not yet 
experienced, but likely to negatively impact its solvency. The Duration Approach formed the basis for 
the estimation of the scenario data that was finally used in capital calculation (see full details on the 
scenario analysis in section 2.7). With the average annual frequency at one, during the Monte Carlo 
simulation simulated, say, one million years, approximately 37% of the years simulated were 
anticipated not to have losses. This is expected as the scenarios are focusing on rare losses that have a 
major impact on the bank. The fact that they are rare does not mean that they cannot happen; in some 
years I have more than five of those events considered to be rare. Thus once the severity buckets for 
each duration or percentile had been estimated distributions were considered in terms of best describing 
the loss distribution. These points (buckets) were used as inputs to a weighted least-squares 







- Step D – Monte Carlo simulation to calculate VaR  
 
The next step was to calculate the expected loss and the regulatory capital at the 99.9th percentile by 
means of Monte Carlo simulation. This was done by implementing the accepted statistical distribution, 
the parameters of the distribution and the estimate of the frequency of an event to occur. Losses for at 
least 1,000,000 possibilities were simulated and the EL and VaR were calculated as follows:  
 
i) For each simulated year, a random draw from the Poisson distribution was generated by means of 
statistical and numerical techniques (given the estimated frequency) to determine the number of 
events that will happen in this year;  
 
ii) For each event in the simulated year, a random loss was generated from the selected statistical 
distribution by means of statistical and numerical techniques (given the estimated parameters of 
the distribution);  
 
iii) The sum of these losses was then taken as the aggregate loss for the simulated year; 
 
iv) After losses were simulated for all the years, the expected loss was then defined as the average 
loss, and the regulatory capital is taken as the 99.9th percentile of these losses simulated for, say, 


























































Construction of Risk Classes 
Cluster Event Type combinations are selected to form Operational Risk Classes. 
 
Operational Risk Classes are mapped to Operational Risk Cells 
 
Step B 
Internal Loss data Preparation 
 
Calculate modelling frequency (Poisson) and Severity 
 
Fit modelling distributions to each class data 
 
Obtain p value of the KS test and Akaike Information Criterion and select best modelling distribution 
 
Perform robustness and stability tests on class data 
 




Scenario data Preparation 
Obtain severity buckets for scenario modelling. 
 
Fit scenario distributions to severity buckets and obtain distribution parameters and weighted least squares (wLSA) 
average. 
 
Select the most suitable risk measurement distribution based on the wLSA value. 
 





Monte Carlo Simulation to Calculate VaR 
Simulate the number of loss for the period, randomly drawing from the Poisson distribution. 
 
Simulate individual loss amounts from the selected severity distribution. The number of losses is that obtained for 
the Poisson distribution above. 
 
Add simulated losses together to obtain the total (aggregate) loss amount for the period. 
 
 
Repeat 1,000,000 times to obtain an aggregate loss distribution. 
 
Perform the above 4 steps for the scenario, and ILD profiles depending on the final modelling inputs that have 
been chosen above. 
 
If there is more than one profile, aggregate loss distributions assuming independence of each simulated total loss 
amount. 
 
If there is more than one class, then aggregate class loss distributions assuming independence.  
 





3.7 TSA process design 
 
For the TSA the internal business lines (BL) were mapped to regulatory or Basel II specified business 
lines. Basel predetermined beta factors are multiplied by the GI of each BL to attain the regulatory 
Operational Risk charge for that business line to arrive at the capital charge for that business line. The 
resulting amount is the capital charge for that business line. The business lines and their respective beta 
factors are Corporate finance (18%), Trading and Sales (18%), Retail Banking (12%), Commercial 
Banking (15%), Payment and settlement (18%), Agency services (15%), Asset Management (12%), 
and Retail Brokerage (12%). The total capital charge was attained by summing the underlying business 
lines’ capital requirements.  
 
3.8 Chapter summary  
 
This chapter thus highlighted the research design, data collection methods, research population, data 
sample, data presentation and research analysis employed in this study. For the purposes of the research 
bank annual reports and publications in local media, trade journals, and operational risk journals were 
used. Lastly, the internet proved to be a major source of secondary information, through various 
websites the researcher managed to secure varied articles on the subject matter.  
 
At a high level the research design looked at: the Poisson distribution was used to model loss frequency 
because of its analytical properties which include the mean being equal to the variance and that the sum 
of two independent Poisson distributions is also Poisson. In a case where the ILD for an ORC is suitable 
for modelling, the parameter estimation was performed using the Method of Maximum Likelihood 
Estimator (MLE). Based on these parameters (A, B and C), the following diagnostic tests are performed 
in order to conclude as to which distribution best fit: Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) to determine 
the most suitable distribution for data set; Kolmogorov-Smirnov test at 5% to validate the goodness of 
fit. Further tests were conducted on the selected distribution to ensure the robustness of the ILD. The 
following tests are performed: Stress testing to test whether the distribution parameters account for 
possible tail events. The ratio of stressed VaR to VaR should be less or equal to two for a distribution 
to be considered for modelling; and Bootstrapping to test the stability of the distribution parameters. 
For parameters to be considered as stable, their volatility must be less than 25%. The final decision 
whether or not to include ILD as a simulation input to capital estimation is based on the success or 
failure of all the above steps. For each of the inputs, whether scenarios or ILD, the aggregated loss 
distribution was constructed using the Monte Carlo method. In performing the Monte Carlo simulation, 
1 million years, each with random severities based on the best fitted distribution materialising and 
aggregated according to the random frequencies informed by the annual loss average, are simulated. 




distribution might be for high severity and low impact losses which do not materialise every year in the 
case of scenarios. To incorporate the day to day losses, the aggregated loss distribution from the ILD is 
added to the scenario aggregated loss distribution without sorting both distributions as the assumption 
is that these losses are independent and random. This allows the aggregation of two or more independent 
risk profiles within a class or an operational risk cell. For example, adding a simulated first year one of 
the day to day losses to simulated first year of the high severity low frequency type losses. This gives 
us a complete picture which accommodates the profiles depicted by the business experience (in terms 
of actual losses) and the forward looking view (in terms of scenario analysis), and from this an EL and 
VaR can be extracted. 
 
The instruments employed in the study were analyzed, and the methods of presentation were described. 
The Operational Risk platform for this thesis is based on SAS Enterprise Governance and Risk 
Compliance (eGRC). This system offered dashboard and analytical capabilities ideal for this research. 
The model was operated using the Matlab software application and also required Microsoft Excel to 
process modelling inputs and outputs. Compiled Matlab® code (executable application) was used for 
all calculations for modelling operational risk data to estimate a risk-sensitive capital requirement. 
Matlab® is a sophisticated statistical analysis and modelling software package with various toolboxes 
containing pre-programmed statistical and mathematical functions. Toolboxes used for calculations in 
this study include the statistical and optimisation toolboxes. Matlab® is widely used in numerous 
industries with many diverse applications, including the financial industry, engineering and the 
military28. Chapter 4 analyses and presents data collected with the aid of tables and shows the extent to 




















RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
The prior chapter outlined the steps taken in developing the proposed design and implementation 
schematics of an Operational Risk Quantification Method for Regulatory Capital using the Basel II’s 
AMA, and the Standardised Approach (TSA). This chapter documents, analyses and discusses the 
results of the research in line with the objectives of the study stated.  
 
4.2 Internal loss data analysis 
 
In assessing the financial institution’s data, it was found that in most cases the type of historical loss 
profile that it depicted related more to the expected loss portion than unexpected loss. The ILD consisted 
of mostly small losses (in terms of severity) and fewer losses that would be regarded as tail losses (large 
in severity, but infrequent). The descriptive statistics of the subject matter bank’s loss profile was 
similar to those of findings of the quantitative impact studies that were conducted by BCBS focusing 
on operational loss data collection exercises (LDCE). The first two such exercises that are done by the 
Risk Management Group (RMG) of the BCBS on an international basis was the 2001 LDCE and 2002 
LDCE29. The study analyzed data from eighty-nine banks that submitted their data. The overarching 
finding, which is in line with the findings of this study  regarding the ILD, was that the loss experience 
of the subject matter bank certainly failed to provide a fully comprehensive sense of the range of 
potential operational risk loss events experienced, and hence emphasizing the need for techniques that 
extend the distribution curve beyond the loss experience of the financial institution in question (case in 
point is scenario analysis, see RMG’s 2001 and 2002 LDCE reports for the full detail on the general 
loss profile). For the purposes of this research the ELD was used to address some of the gaps that are 
left by ILD due to its inability to capture tail event risks. The ELD was, however not directly 
incorporated into the model, though some techniques like the Extreme Value Theory, (EVT) maybe 
used to combine ILD, and ELD as direct inputs to model, commonly referred to mixture models (Dutta 






                                                          




4.3 Summary of scenario data fitting   
 
The inputs to the scenario fitting process are the severity buckets. For scenarios the severity buckets are 
fitted using the duration approach (see section 2.7.2 for additional context on the duration approach). 
Table 3.3 summarises the scenario data that was considered for modelling. A total of 27 operational risk 
cells (ORC) were identified which represent actual and potential loss systems where losses can occur. In 
all of the scenarios, lognormal was found to be the best fitting distributions based on the fitting criterion, 
with λ=1. Notwithstanding that in this thesis l assumed a Poisson parameter of one, additional extensive 
analysis on the effect of this assumption should be carried out (future research). Thus, I do concede that 
neither sensitivity nor “validation” analyses has been done confirming that this assumption makes it 
consistent with the historical profile of the given data set.  
 
Nonetheless, the overall distribution  with  the  least  wLSA  after  fitting  the  scenarios  was  the  
lognormal distribution. The Lognormal is a sub-exponential distribution that seemingly adequately 
estimated the tail properties of this data set. To support and confirm the choice made using the wLSA, 
different graphical goodness–of–fit tests could be considered, despite them not having been considered 
in this thesis. These include the box plots for all the parameters and the wLSA, the aggregated loss 
distribution profile. However, the selection of just the Lognormal from the 4 [Lognormal, Weibull, 
Burr, Generalized Pareto, Pareto and Gamma distributions] considered distributions needs to be 
investigated further, with possibly broadening the portfolio of distributions to reflect both heavy and 
fat tailed phenomena. The additional distributions that can be considered are the Nonparametric–
Gaussian, and the Exponential severity distributions (see other possibilities from Synman, 2011).  
 
During the penultimate stage of Monte Carlo simulation, both the frequency distribution and the severity 
distribution were convoluted to form a single aggregate loss distribution which is then used to determine 
the VaR. The largest operational risk cell or class is class number 22, with a VaR of R353 million (see 















Table 4.1: Scenario data capital output (scenario parameters, VaR) 
 
OR Class Distribution A B Freq. wLSA30 VaR 
1 Lognormal 14.06168 1.5548 1 0.86 160 272 259 
2 Lognormal 14.79961 0.758 1 0.07 34 375 892 
3 Lognormal 15.02056 0.8549 1 0.76 54 753 701 
4 Lognormal 13.4109 1.7842 1 0.37 168 543 997 
5 Lognormal 16.93749 0.7151 1 1.18 262 084 752 
6 Lognormal 14.93534 1.202 1 0.65 132 989 110 
7 Lognormal 15.13993 0.8513 1 0.63 60 576 321 
8 Lognormal 14.43572 1.0959 1 1.07 59 812 455 
9 Lognormal 14.98556 1.332 1 0.42 205 742 853 
10 Lognormal 14.87185 1.334 1 0.78 187 649 676 
11 Lognormal 14.45428 1.5127 1 0.67 209 854 237 
12 Lognormal 14.31579 1.6948 1 0.71 314 960 845 
13 Lognormal 14.0314 1.5804 1 1.15 168 419 703 
14 Lognormal 15.59286 1.2213 1 0.7 274 848 716 
15 Lognormal 15.50284 0.9436 1 0.57 112 184 264 
16 Lognormal 14.04517 1.3702 1 0.98 90 735 328 
17 Lognormal 14.47808 0.9604 1 0.05 42 249 872 
18 Lognormal 12.90182 1.244 1 0.61 19 804 547 
19 Lognormal 13.93846 0.9083 1 0.12 21 409 434 
20 Lognormal 14.79807 0.7784 1 0.26 35 920 830 
21 Lognormal 13.30229 1.7286 1 1.07 126 385 922 
22 Lognormal 14.63594 1.6202 1 0.5 352 652 933 
23 Lognormal 15.0356 0.5543 1 0.69 28 036 795 
24 Lognormal 16.62515 0.9028 1 0.74 309 223 767 
25 Lognormal 15.79127 1.0569 1 0.21 205 253 629 
26 Lognormal 15.55257 0.985 1 0.93 132 739 752 
27 Lognormal 14.87235 1.1973 1 0.33 124 266 394 
 
4.4 Summary of internal loss data fitting   
 
Of the total of 27 classes, only 16 classes had more than 25 data points. Of the 16 classes that had more 
than 25 data points, only 5 classes passed all the robustness tests to allow the data to be directly used in 
the model as an input. In Table 4.2, most of the datasets that failed the bootstrapping had heavy tails. For 
example, ORC 14 encompasses two profiles in one data set. That is, even though they have a few losses 
that result to heavy tails in their context, their data is dominated by small losses. Hence, during the 
process of resampling, especially in the scale parameter, the volatility becomes very large. For stress 
testing, classes that have ILD dominated by the low severity losses with a single outlier (based on the 
data set) have less sensitive parameters. In instances where the ILD captures two different profiles in one 
data set, where it is dominated by low severity events but there are some high severity events as well, 
                                                          




this results in some instabilities during the fitting process, as the MLE better fits the body than the tail of 
the distribution. Hence, the stressed VaR exceeds the ratio of 2 when compared to the VaR. For ORC’s 
where no distribution exists, the data was insufficient for modelling. This was the case for OR class 1, 
4, 7, 8, 9, 12, 19, 24, 25, 26 and 27.  
 




Distribution A B C Freq Stress 
testing 
Bootstrapping Decision  VaR  
1 - - - - - - - -  -  
2 Lognormal 9.4952 2.1484 - 26.17 Reject Accept Reject  94 958 000  
3 Lognormal 3.0297 3.39 - 30.5 Reject Reject Reject  195 900 000  
4 - - - - - - - -  -  
5 Burr 0.0052 9991.08 80.55 4.67 Reject Reject Reject  83 241 000  
6 Lognormal 10.6409 2.2434 - 17.33 Reject Accept Reject  297 120 000  
7 - - - - - - - -  -  
8 - - - - - - - -  -  
9 - - - - - - - -  -  
10 Lognormal 2.7983 3.5783 - 35 Accept Reject Reject  398 390 000  
11 Lognormal 10.2102 1.3581 - 72 Accept Accept Accept  15 802 000  
12 - - - - - - - -  -  
13 Lognormal 8.0061 2.4166 - 7.67 Reject Reject Reject  42 228 000  
14 Lognormal 5.6802 2.5916 - 135 Accept Reject Reject  94 960 000  
15 Lognormal 9.2877 1.1066 - 1525 Accept Accept Accept  57 157 000  
16 Lognormal 10.16 2.1782 - 30 Reject Accept Reject  200 220 000  
17 Lognormal 10.4041 1.2864 - 21.33 Accept Accept Accept  7 575 900  
18 Lognormal 8.6805 1.8004 - 30.83 Accept Accept Accept  14 066 000  
19 - - - - - - - -  -  
20 Lognormal 9.0614 2.8436 - 5.33 Reject Reject Reject  366 630 000  
21 Burr 0.003 256.2487 68.41 43 Accept Reject Reject  4 996  
22 Lognormal 9.6027 1.2824 - 8.17 Reject Reject Reject  2 416 300  
23 Lognormal 10.4427 1.7157 - 20.83 Accept Accept Accept  35 752 000  
24 - - - - - - - -  -  
25 - - - - - - - -  -  
26 - - - - - - - -  -  
27 - - - - - - - -  -  
 
Of the 16 classes that had sufficient data points, only 5 classes passed all the robustness tests to allow 
the data to be directly used as an input into the model. The BCBS 196 (par 165), states that there should 
be an optimum balance between the granularity of the class, and the volume of historical loss data for 
the respective ORCs especially when used in conjunction with a LDA. Although the definition and 
number of ORCs fall within the range of AMA practice, the mapping of internal losses into 27 cells 
results in some ORCs having very few observations, often insufficient data for modelling (according to 
the criterion chosen to allow modelling of ILD). The insufficient number of data points contributes to 
limit the role of ILD over final capital figure. A coarser ORCs scheme could be evaluated and tested in 




4.5 Summary of stand-alone regulatory capital using AMA 
 
This final step was to calculate the regulatory capital at the 99.9th percentile by means of Monte Carlo 
simulation. This was done by implementing the accepted statistical distribution, the parameters of the 
distribution and the estimate of the frequency of an event to occur. Losses for at least 1,000,000 
possibilities were simulated and VaR were calculated as detailed in Step D in chapter 3. Assessing the 
use of 1 million data points fulfils the minimum requirements of 1,082 observations for a typical Poisson 
distribution, and 1 million points for a severity distribution like lognormal. In section 1.2.1(d) of this 
thesis, the BCBS stipulates that regulatory capital must be composed of expected loss (EL) and 
unexpected loss (UL), unless permission has been granted by the relevant regulators to implement 
additional capital discounts. The following table details the overall outcome of this thesis, showing the 
individual EL and Var for each ORC:  
 
Table 4.3: Stand-alone regulatory capital using AMA 
 
Cell EL  VaR  
Cell1 4 253 538  158 984 224  
Cell2 7 007 372  41 547 632  
Cell3 7 148 871  56 972 316  
Cell4 3 265 174  168 435 200  
Cell5 29 343 740  261 588 336  
Cell6 15 330 386  166 387 872  
Cell7 3 390 424  60 020 020  
Cell8 7 817 782  205 501 856  
Cell9 8 317 454  187 215 152  
Cell10 12 194 215  214 488 832  
Cell11 6 918 291  318 781 920  
Cell12 4 317 652  169 687 824  
Cell13 12 450 980  271 859 200  
Cell14 57 647 432  162 065 680  
Cell15 19 365 968  172 976 832  
Cell16 3 077 603  42 249 720  
Cell17 7 486 977  52 324 000  
Cell18 1 705 683  21 330 804  
Cell19 3 611 945  35 859 360  
Cell20 6 186 179  151 924 928  
Cell21 8 390 612  347 731 328  
Cell22 8 005 730  41 949 584  
Cell23 24 961 614  308 966 528  
Cell24 12 586 047  205 077 104  
Cell25 9 222 884  133 354 136  
Cell26 5 879 475  123 923 936  





Thus from the 1.2.1 (d) stipulation, VaR = EL + UL, in this instance the overall VaR is R4 billion, and 
the EL is R289.88 million, therefore the UL is given by VaR – EL = R4 081 204 324 - R289 884 000, 
will give the Unexpected portion of R3, 791, 320, 324. However, it is conceded that according to 
BCBS 196 the arithmetic mean has been known to cause an inaccurate view of the expected loss 
quantum due to its sensitivity to tail losses. The BCBS text goes on to advocate for the use of statistical 
approaches that do not seem to exhibit the same flaws as the arithmetic mean, namely the median, 
trimmed mean. In the thesis, the chosen EL measure is the expectation of the annual loss distribution, 
i.e. the arithmetic mean of the annual losses. The impact of this could also be an element of further 
study.  
 
4.6 Summary of regulatory capital using TSA. 
 
For the TSA the internal business lines were mapped to a series of regulatory (Basel II) business lines. 
Basel predetermined beta factors are multiplied by the GI of each BL to attain the regulatory Operational 
Operational Risk charge for that business line (BSCS, 2006) to arrive at the capital charge for that 
business line. The resulting amount is the capital charge for that business line. The business lines and 
their respective beta factors are Corporate Finance (18%), Trading and Sales (18%), Retail Banking 
(12%), Commercial Banking (15%), Payment and Settlement (18%), Agency Services (15%), Asset 
Management (12%), and Retail Brokerage (12%). The total capital charge was attained by summing of 
the underlying business lines’ capital requirements.  
 
Table 4.4: Stand-alone regulatory capital using TSA 
 
 Dec-10 Dec-11 Dec-12 Risk Exposure Beta Factor Capital Requirements 
Corporate Finance   740 044 332.66   1 525 869 278.45   1 775 550 461.58     1 347 154 690.90  18%   242 487 844.36  
Trading and Sales 10 870 864 744.54    6 751 847 621.24   14 525 727 666.39    10 716 146 677.39  18% 1 928 906 401.93  
Retail Brokerage  148 936 228.28   168 120 304.65   493 893 766.00     270 316 766.31  12%  32 438 011.96  
Commercial Bank  7 294 870 520.95   7 775 609 760.61   8 760 414 829.46    7 943 631 703.67  15%  1 191 544 755.55  
Retail Banking 7 731 890 019.81   13 917 532 234.48     7 842 215 813.27    9 830 546 022.52  12%   1 179 665 522.70  
Payment & Sett 25 389 715.73   75 499 599.29   85 465 748.96     62 118 354.66  18%  11 181 303.84  
Agency Services     311 326 553.35     289 863 006.14   112 968 561.29    238 052 706.93  15%   35 707 906.04  
Asset Management  252 003 636.33       66 427.72     454 776.30     84 174 946.78  12%  10 100 993.61  
Insurance  (1 863 676.81)           150 273.90           -         150 273.90                                   -    













 Aggregate TSA Aggregate AMA 
Group Consolidated 4 632 032 739.99 4 081 204 324 
 
Financial institutions in South Africa are given the option to use the following operational risk capital 
estimation methods which are listed in their descending order of risk sensitivity: the AMA, the TSA or 
the BIA. The BIA and TSA are predetermined by the SARB, whilst AMA relies on internally generated 
methodologies. These estimation approaches were initially introduced by the BCBS, largely premised 
on an increasingly sophisticated approach to the quantification of capital to incentivise financial 
institutions to improve their risk management and measurement methods, while benefiting from a lower 
capital charge through gradating from the least to the most sophisticated measurement tool. Financial 
institutions have to make a substantial investment in order to move from TSA to AMA. However the 
benefit for moving to AMA is not readily obvious. This study extended Sundmacher (2007)’s work, 
and tested one instance of AMA regulatory capital against that of TSA, in a bid to crystalise the rand 
benefit that South African financial institutions stand to attain (if at all) should they move from TSA to 
AMA. It must be noted however that the goal of the thesis was not to explicitly measure the costs of 
the switch but to determine whether the benefits are such that they would warrant a bank then assessing 
the costs of switching. The rand benefit for this instance of the data analysed (2007 to 2012), is found 
to be TSA – AMA (4 632 032 739.99 - 4 081 204 324 = R550, 828, 415). In case of moving from the 
TSA to the AMA, there is a substantial incentive for financial institutions in South Africa to do so. 
AMA being risk sensitive awards the subject matter bank a capital benefit of 12% in comparison to its 
TSA calculated capital (which is largely based on a beta factor arbitrarily applied against the gross 
operating income of that segment of the business). 
 
Using this illustrated process banks can calculate the rand benefit for multiple years. Given multiple 
year benefit one may determine the threshold of initial investment for the bank. This initial benefit 
would be for changes in IT systems in order to effect the change from TSA to AMA. On the basis that 
in adopting AMA, a significant number of international banks adopt LDA31. In conducting this thesis, 
emphasis was placed on all key building blocks of an LDA in a bid to show a sound mathematical 
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4.7 Chapter summary  
 
The chapter presented the research findings and went on to analyze them. For each of the inputs, 
whether scenario, ILD, ELD an aggregated loss distribution was constructed using the Monte Carlo 
method. In performing a Monte Carlo simulation, 1 million years, each with random severities based 
on the best fitted distribution that materialized and was aggregated according to the random frequencies 
informed by the annual loss average, were simulated. This meant that each input had its own aggregated 
loss distribution. In all of the scenarios, lognormal was found to be the best fitting distribution based on 
the fitting criterion stated in the prior chapter (see also Moscadell, 2004). From the total of 27 classes, 
only 16 classes had more than 25 data points. From the 16 classes that had more than 25 data points, 
only 5 classes passed all the robustness tests to allow the data to be directly used as an input into the 
model. Most of the datasets that failed the bootstrapping had heavy tails. The following chapter presents 

































This chapter presents a summary of the entire research, and goes on to give recommendations on the 
area of study, a conclusion of the research study and suggestions for future research. The conclusions 
will reflect on how the objectives to the study highlighted in the first chapter have been achieved.  
 
Operational risk has increased in importance in recent years due to massive operational losses that 
headlined financial markets across the world. The structure and approach to this study employed a case 
study based analysis found in Sundmacher (2007) who assessed the case of a financial institution 
moving from the BIA to the TSA, using hypothesized data. In any event ILD is regarded as proprietary 
information, and as such in this thesis I limit the scope of my work to one set of collated data that 
belongs to one of the big four banks domiciled in South Africa. Notwithstanding that the data set is 
restricted to just one of the big four, the scope of this thesis is to illustrate a methodology that is 
representable (or generalisable) to the other big banks within South Africa. Effectively, this study 
extends the work of Sundmacher (2007) by taking cognizance of the fact that financial institutions have 
to make a substantial investment in order to move from TSA to AMA, and thus the benefit for moving 
to AMA is not readily obvious.  To quantify the capital benefit, the TSA and an AMA developed model 
is applied to one instance of live data. It must be noted however that the goal of the thesis is not to 
explicitly measure the costs of the switch but to determine whether the benefits are such that they would 
warrant a bank then assessing the costs of switching. 
 
For the TSA, Basel predetermined beta factors are multiplied by the GI of each BL to attain the 
regulatory Operational Risk charge for that business line. The capital charge for each business line was 
summed up to obtain the total operational risk capital charge under the TSA. The AMA modelling 
process was done in four stages. Firstly, risk classes were constructed based on the business line of the 
analysed bank. Secondly, the frequency of loss was modelled using the Poisson distribution. 
Additionally, loss distributions were considered in terms of their modelling ability of the loss data. 
Distributions which include Lognormal, Weibull, and Burr, Generalised Pareto, Pareto and Gamma 
distributions were used in modelling loss severities. The KS and AIC tests were employed to gauge the 
goodness of fit of the mentioned loss distributions, and hence making a choice of the two distributions 
to be used at a further data analysis stage. Thirdly, scenario analysis was conducted to measure the 
impact of the risk events. This was based on the two chosen distributions, namely the Lognormal and 




with an overall aim of calculating the expected loss and VaR. The operational risk capital charge using 
AMA was taken as the 99.9th percentile of the losses simulated. 
 
It is found that there is a substantial incentive for financial institutions in South Africa to do so. AMA 
being risk sensitive awards the subject matter bank a capital benefit of 12% in comparison to its TSA 
calculated capital (which is largely based on a beta factor arbitrarily applied against the gross operating 
income of that segment of the business). Using this illustrated process banks can calculate the rand 
benefit for multiple years. Given multiple year benefit one may determine the threshold of initial 
investment for the bank. This initial benefit would be for changes in IT systems in order to effect the 
change from TSA to AMA. 
 
5.2 Suggested recommendations for further research  
 
The AMA developed and applied model uses a total of 27 classes (largely dependent on the structure of 
the subject matter bank), of which only 16 classes had more than 25 data points. The limited data points, 
which is bound to be a challenge across all banks in South Africa with ambitions to move from TSA to 
AMA, results in model being mainly scenario-driven. The direct role of ILD within the proposed AMA 
model is thus limited. This resultant number is considered to be relatively low (at 5/27). Plausible 
solutions to this predicament which requires further research could be found through allowing for 
evaluation of the “second best” ILD model, by modelling a unique body severity distribution at enterprise 
level, and applying it to different business units, or by using a coarser level of granularity which could 
increase the accuracy of the estimation using ILD and its overall influence on the resulting capital 
estimates.  
 
Further research should also be considered to evaluate a more direct use of ELD. This could be achieved 
for example by mixing at either data level (i.e. “pooled data”) or severity distribution (i.e. mixture of 
distributions) level, ILD and ELD components (Zhou, Giancometti, Fabozzi and Tucker, 2012). The 
methodologies in combining external and internal data are strongly related to the quality of the external 
databases. At the time of authoring this thesis, the available external databases did not meet all the quality 
criteria expected for a statistical use (threshold for fitting, categorisation, firm’s figures for scalability). 
Therefore, these methodologies were not implemented in this thesis.  One of the possible theories is the 
Credibility Theory. The insurance industry traditionally has developed and used credibility theory to deal 
with situations in which data is obtained from different sources. For a given population distribution that 
one estimates, the data from each source may be useful in describing the characteristics of the 
distribution, but no source can be used alone to give a full story. To paint a balanced picture, one may 
use a weighted average of the parameters estimated from several sources. The determination of the 




Alternative methods such as the extreme value theory, non-parametric empirical sampling, Markov 
Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC), and Bayesian approaches could be used in further studies. 
 
The incorporation of a well-reasoned estimate of diversification benefits may be factored in at the group-
wide level or at the banking subsidiary level subject to supervisory approval (BCBS, 2006). In order to 
take into account the diversification effect, the correlation between the different operational risk cells 
(ORC) has to be measured or estimated. When losses are aggregated across risk categories to calculate 
diversified total risk for a business unit, one technical issue that arises is how to account for correlations 
among the categories. In most South African banks, there is rarely enough data to support comprehensive 
correlation analysis. Moreover, it is strenuous to incorporate correlations into the mechanical process of 
calculating total loss exposure unless the joint distribution is the normal distribution (which is very 
unlikely to be the case). After all, correlations alone do not define the behaviour of losses across different 
categories in terms of a joint probability distribution. Finally, the currently available methods for 
calculating aggregate distributions in the actuarial framework models aggregate distributions through 
frequency and severity but does not address the correlation issues well. No currently available framework 
effectively addresses correlation while also directly modelling aggregate distributions, making this a 
worthwhile further research note.  
 
5.3 Conclusion  
 
The overall outcome of the research is fairly satisfactory as supported by the ultimate results, both the 
TSA and AMA quantification techniques applied were compliant with the SARB and the BCBS list of 
requirements. In this chapter, recommendations for further research and analysis on the model 
implementation and methodology have been identified. These recommendations are concerning possible 
areas of improvement in the model theory (post assessment of the model results), the quantification 
methodology overall and capital calculation process for assurance in the consistency of the capital 
calculation parts. The general recommendation on the area of further research concerns the use of the 
available internal data, whose influence could possibly be increased and ultimately improve accuracy. 
Also additional investigations with regard to the external data, scaled according to the risk profile of the 
bank, should be looked at so as to have more influence on the capital model. Additionally, continued 
research should be done for instances where no data collection is possible, to strongly assess market best 
practice. Overall the identification of a list of areas of further analysis (post assessing the results) is 
natural for any research article and does not indicate the presence of elements that are able to cause 
severe misspecification of the risk profile of a would be AMA applicant Bank. The author anticipates 
that this thesis though done in a case study format owing to data privacy restrictions (effectively limiting 
the number of data sets that could be used for this research), will have a far reaching practical impact for 




coming up with an AMA framework, and ultimately assist in their attainment of a + / - 12% relief in 
operational risk regulatory capital, as granular detail on how to implement an LDA [that is fully 
compliant with all international standards] is extensively discussed.  
 
Post completion of this piece of work, the Basel II committee has announced its intentions to possibly 
replace all existing and proposed methods with a Standardised Measurement Approach (SMA). On 
March 4, 2016, the Basel Committee released for consultation the new SMA, which is intended to replace 
all previous approaches including the AMA to calculating how much capital banks must set aside to 
cover operational risks. The key criticism against AMA by the Basel Committee has been its extensive 
complexity and it being inconsistently applied thus producing wildly divergent capital levels across the 
banks. The Committee has described the method as being difficult to implement and having various 
possibilities that can be adopted in its implementation leading to major differences across banks 
(Hegarty, M, 2015).  
 
However, the authors’ view is that AMA has been a leap frog in the evolution of understanding 
operational risk. If there is considerable need for comparison across banks, and model simplicity, Basel 
Committee would rather focus on possibly reducing the confidence level from 99.9% to 95%; restricting 
the range of distributions that might be used to fit ILD; increasing guidance with regard to Scenario 
building (taking into account Near Miss events that may serve as signalling devices for rare but big 
events) etc. The SMA is said to be “designed to suit all banks, irrespective of their size and risk profile”. 
However, the author believes that operational risk by its very nature is idiosyncratic to the bank’s 
processes, people, systems and such making it highly incomprehensible that a singular formula based on 
a Business Indicator (BI) and ILD Loss Factor (over a 10 year period), can be so structured to fully 
describe the unexpected loss patterns for each bank across the world.  
 
For South African banks in particular, the South African Reserve Bank has insinuated32 (an unofficial 
statement) that models are likely to be relegated to Pillar II reporting (Economic Capital (ECAP) 
calculations), as opposed to Pillar I (Regulatory Capital). The final decision on the fate of AMA shall be 
made at the close of 2016, South African banks should view this as an opportunity to so alter their models 
to have a more increased focus on risk management (as the regulatory stick is removed). Thus since 
banks will need to continue to quantify operational risks for ECAP purposes, the quantification may now 
use approaches that best meet business needs and achieve more objectives than just capital calculations. 
This research work will thus continue to serve its intended purposes albeit for ECAP purposes as opposed 
to RegCap. 
 







Afambo, A. (2005). ‘Operational risk capital provisions for banks and insurance companies’, 






Alderweireld, T., Garcia, J. and Léonard, L. 2006. ‘A practical operational risk scenario analysis 
quantification’, Risk.Net. 1 February. 93 – 95. 
Allen, L. and Bali, T.G. (2004). ‘Cyclicality in Catastrophic and Operational Risk Measurements’, 
Working Paper, City University of New York, September. 
Anderson, T. W. and Darling, D. A. 1954. ‘A test of goodness of fit’, Journal of the American Statistical 
Association, 48(268): 765 – 769. 
Baud, N., Frachot, A. and Roncalli, T. 2003. ‘How to avoid over-estimating capital charge for 
operational risk?’, Operational Risk – Risk’s Newsletter. February. 
BCBS. 2003. ‘Basel II: The New Basel Capital Accord - third consultative paper’ [online]. Switzerland: 
Bank for international settlements. 
 Available from: http://www.bis.org/bcbs/bcbscp3.htm 
 [Accessed: 15 May 2016] 
BCBS. 2006. ‘International convergence of capital measurement and capital standards - a revised 
framework, comprehensive version’ [online]. Switzerland: Bank for international settlements. 
Available from: < http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf > 
[Accessed: 10 April 2015] 
BCBS. 2009. ‘Basel II: Strengthening the resilience of the banking sector [online]. Switzerland: Bank 
for international settlements. 
 Available from: <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs164.pdf> 
 [Accessed: 15 May 2016] 
BCBS. 2011. ‘Operational risk – supervisory guidelines for the advanced measurement approaches’ 
[online]. Switzerland: Bank for international settlements.  
Available from: < http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs196.pdf > 
[Accessed: 10 April 2015] 
Berger, J. 1985. ‘Statistical Decision Theory and Bayesion Analysis’. New York: Springer-Verlag. 
Bocker, K. and Kluppelberg, C. 2005. ‘Operational VaR: a closed form solution’, RISK Magazine.  
December. 90–93. 
Bühlmann, H. and Gisler, A. 2005. ‘A course in credibility and its applications’. Berlin Heidelberg: 
Springer. 
Chernobai, A., Rachev, S. T. and Fabozzi, F. J. 2012. ‘Composite goodness-of-fit tests for left-truncated 
loss samples’, In: Lee, C-F.   ed. Handbook of financial econometrics and statistics. New York: 
Springer. 575-596. 
Chernobai, A. and Rachev, S. T. 2006. ‘Applying robust methods to operational risk modelling’,  
Journal of Operational Risk, 1(1):27-41.   
Cruz, M. G. 2002. ‘Modeling, Measuring and Hedging Operational Risk’. Chichester: Wiley. 
De Fontnouvelle, P., DeJesus-Rueff, V., Jordan, J. and Rosengren, E. 2003. ‘Using loss data to quantify 
operational risk’ [online]. United States: Stern New York University. 
Available from: < http://www.stern.nyu.edu/om/faculty/pinedo/ofs/operationalloss.pdf > 
[Accessed: 15 April 2015] 
De Fontnouvelle, P., Rosengren, E. and Jordan, J. 2004. ‘Implications of Alternative Operational Risk 




Available from: < http://www.nber.org/chapters/c9617.pdf > 
[Accessed: 15 April 2015] 
De Jongh, De Jongh, De Jongh and van Vuuren (2012) entitled ‘A review of operational risk in banks 
and its role in the financial crisis’ (South African Journal of Economic and Management 
Studies, 16(4), 364-382) 
Diebold, F. X., Schuermann, T. and Stroughair, J. D. 1998. ‘Pitfalls and opportunities in the use of 
extreme value theory in risk management’. In. Refenes, A. P. N., Moody, J. D. and Burgess, A. 
N.  eds., Advances in computational finance. Amsterdam: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 3–12.  
Dutta, K. and Perry, J. 2006. ‘A tale of tails: An empirical analysis of loss distribution models for 
estimating operational risk capital’ [online]. United States: The Federal Reserve Bank of 
Boston. 
Available from: < https://www.bostonfed.org/economic/wp/wp2006/wp0613.pdf > 
[Accessed: 15 April 2015] 
Efron. B. F. 1979 ‘Bootstrap Methods: Another Look at the Jackknife’. Annals of Statistics Volume 7,  
Number 1, 1-26 
Efron, B. F. and Tibshirani, R. J. 1993. An Introduction To The Bootstrap. London: Chapman and Hall. 
El Arif, F. Z. and Hinti, S. 2014. ‘Methods of Quantifying Operational Risk in Banks: Theoretical 
approaches’. American Journal of Engineering Research, Vol 3, Issue 03, 283 – 244.  
Embrechts, P., Kaufmann, R., and Samorodnitsky, G. (2004). ‘Ruin theory revisited: Stochastic  
models for operational risk’, http://www.Math.Ethz.Ch/~baltes/ftp/ersamo.Pdf. Risk 
Management for Central Bank Foreign Reserves: 243-261. 
Embrechts, P., Kluppelberg, C. and Mikosch, C. 1997. ‘Modelling extremal events for insurance and 
finance’. New York:Springer. 
Embrechts, P., Lindskog, F. and McNeil, A. J. 2003. ‘Modelling dependence with copulas and 
applications to risk management’. In: Rachev, S. T. ed. Handbook of heavy tailed distributions 
in finance. Amsterdam: Elsevier/North-Holland. 307-327. 
Ergashev, B. 2008. ‘Should risk managers rely on maximum likelihood estimation method while 
quantifying operational risk?’, Journal of Operational Risk, 3(2):63-86. 
Fitch Risk Management. (2004). ‘Fitch sees hitch in Basel operational risk rules’. Technical report, 
Reuters 04 21 04 5 2/ AM ET. 
Frachot, A., Moudoulaud, O. and Roncalli, T. 2003. ‘Loss distribution approach in practice’ [online]. 
France: Thierry-Roncalli. 
Available from: < http://www.thierry-roncalli.com/download/lda-practice.pdf > 
[Accessed: 10 April 2015]  
Francesco, S. and Todri Ardita, M (2012). ‘Why the Implementation of Advanced Measurement  
Approach in Operational Risk Management Isn’t A So Good Idea: The Albanian Banking 
System Case’. International Journal of Business and Commerce Vol. 1, Issue No.12, [47-55]. 
Froot, K. A. 2003. ‘Bank Capital and Risk Management: Operational Risks in Context.’[PowerPoint  
Presentation] “No date”. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Boston. 
Hegarty, M. (2015). ‘Basel committee to consult on scrapping op risk modelling’ by [online]. Available  
at:http://www.risk.net/operational-risk-and-regulation/news/2429034/basel-committee-to-
consult-on-scrapping-op-risk-modelling].  
[Accessed on 02/05/2016]. 
Kaiser, T. and Kohne, M. (2006). An Introduction to Operational Risk. London: Risk Books, (Chp 3). 
King, J. L. 2001. ‘Operational risk: Measurements and Modelling’. Chichester: Wiley. 
Klugman, S. A., Panjer, H. H. and Willmot, G. E. 1998. ‘Loss models: from data to decisions. New  
Jersey: Wiley. 





Lambrigger, D. D., Shevchenko, P. V. and Wüthrich, M. V. 2007. ‘The quantification of operational 
risk using internal data, relevant external data and expert opinions’, Journal of Operational 
Risk, 2(3):3-27. 
Lavaud, S. and Lehérissé, V. 2014. ‘Goodness-of-fit tests and selection methods for operational risk’,  
Journal of Operational Risk, 9(3):21-50. 
Laycock.M. 2014. Operational risk quantification: the advanced measurement approach. Thomas  
Reuters. accelus.thomsonreuters.com 
Mignola, J. and Ugoccioni, R. 2006. ‘Sources of uncertainty in modelling operational risk losses’,  
Journal of Operational Risk, 1(2):33-50. 
Morone, M., Cornaglia, A. and Mignola, G. 2007. ‘Economic capital assessment via copulas: 
aggregation and allocation of different risk types’ [online]. United States: Default Risk. 
Available from: < http://defaultrisk.com > 
[Accessed: 18 April 2015] 
Moscadelli, M. 2004. ‘The modelling of operational risk: experience with the analysis of the data 
collected by the Basel Committee’ [online]. Italy: Banca d’italia. 
Available from: 
<http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni /econo/temidi/td04/td517_04/td517/tema_517.pdf> 
 [Accessed: 20 April 2015]  
Nash, R.A. (2003). ‘The Three Pillars of Operational Risk, in Alexander, C. (ed) Operational Risk: 
Regulation, Analysis and Management. London: Prentice Hall-Financial Times’, (Chapter 1). 
Opdyke, J. D. 2014. ‘Estimating operational risk capital with greater accuracy, precision and 
robustness’, Journal of Operational Risk, 9(4):3-82. 
ORX. 2010. ORX capital methodology survey 2010 [online]. Switzerland: ORX. 
Available from: < https://www.orx.org/awg > 
[Accessed: 20 April 2015] 
Panjer, H. H. 2006. ‘Operational risks: Modeling Analytics’. New York: Wiley 
Peters, J-P. and Hübner, G. 2009. ‘Modeling operational risk based on multiple expert’s opinions’. In:  
Gregoriou, G. N. ed. Operational risk toward Basel III, best practices and issues in modeling, 
management and regulation. New York: Wiley. 3–21. 
Reiss, R. D. and Thomas, M. 2001. ‘Statistical Analysis of Extreme Values’. 2nd ed. Basel: Birkhauser. 
Rebonato, R. (2007). ‘The Plight of the Fortune Tellers: Why We Need to Manage Financial Risk  
Differently’. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, (Chapter 8). 
Robert, C. P. 2001. The Bayesian choice: A Decision Theoretic Motivation. 2nd ed. New York: Springer- 
Verlag. 
Shevchenko, P. V. 2010. ‘Calculation of aggregate loss distributions’, The Journal of Operational Risk, 
5(2):3–40. 
Shevchenko, P.V. 2010. ‘Implementing loss distribution approach for operational risk’, Applied  
Stochastic Models in Business and Industry, 26(3):277–307. 
Shevchenko, P. V. 2011. Modelling Operational Risk Using Bayesian Inference. Berlin: Springer.  
Shevchenko, P. V. and Wüthrich, M. V. 2006. ‘The structural modelling of operational risk via  
Bayesian inference: combining loss data with expert opinions’, The Journal of Operational 
Risk, 1(3):3 – 26. 
Snyman, P. 2011. ‘Risk–based capital measures for operational risk management’ [online]. South 
Africa: North West University.  
Available from: <  http://hdl.handle.net/10394/7573 > 
[Accessed: 18 April 2015] 
Steinhoff, C. and Baule, R. 2006. ‘How to validate op risk distributions’ [online]. Denmark: Deriva. 
Available from: < http://www.deriva.de/files/validateoprisk.pdf > 




Sundmacher, M. 2007. ‘The basic indicator approach and the standardised approach to operational risk: 
an example- and case study-based analysis [online]. United States: Social Science Electronic 
Publishing’. 
Available from: < http://ssrn.com/abstract=988282 > 
[Accessed: 10 April 2015] 
Sundmacher. M. 2004 ‘Operational risk measurement in banks: arbitrage, adjustments and alternatives’.  
Electronic copy of this paper is available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=963231. School of 
Economics and Finance. University of Western Sydney 
Tsai, C-L. and Hurvich, C. M. 1988. ‘Regression and time series model selection in small samples’,  
Biometrika,76 (2):297 – 307. 
Valova. I. 2011 ‘Basel II Approaches for the calculation of the regulatory capital for operational risk’.  
No 1 / 2011. Masaryk University, Faculty of Economics and Administration. Lipova 41a, 120 
00 Brno.  
Zhou, X., Giancometti, R., Fabozzi, F. J. and Tucker, A. H. 2012. ‘Bayesian estimation of truncated 
data with applications to operational risk measurement’, Quantitative Finance, 14(5):863-888. 
